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abstract.  In District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme 
Court made seemingly irreconcilable demands on lower courts: evaluate Second Amendment 
claims through history, avoid balancing, and retain as much regulation as possible. To date, 
lower courts have been unable to devise a test that satisfies all three of these conditions. Worse, 
the emerging default candidate, intermediate scrutiny, is a test that many jurists and scholars 
consider exceedingly manipulable.  
This Article argues that courts could look to the Supreme Court’s Seventh Amendment 
jurisprudence, and in particular the Seventh Amendment’s “historical test,” to help them devise a 
test for the Second. The historical test relies primarily on analogical reasoning from text, history, 
and tradition to determine the constitutionality of any given practice or regulation. Yet the 
historical test is supple enough to respond to the demands of a twenty-first-century judicial 
system. As such, it provides valuable insights, but also its own set of problems, for those judges 
and scholars struggling to implement the right to keep and bear arms. 
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In District of Columbia v. Heller,1 and its sequel, McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,2 the Court posed a riddle. The riddle can be restated like this:  
What test adheres to the Second Amendment’s past, rejects balancing 
that right against present government interests, and preserves all but 
the most draconian regulations for the future?  
The Court’s nascent Second Amendment jurisprudence is a riddle because 
while the Court demands the most scrupulous investigation of history and a 
near-blanket prohibition on balancing, it also states that a number of modern 
regulations are “presumptively lawful”3 despite their dubious historical 
provenance or their interest-balancing origins. 
The Court’s challenge has left many judges frustrated because, as discussed 
in more detail below, the Court’s demands appear to be facially irreconcilable. 
Some judges have answered by mechanically citing broad dicta in Heller and 
McDonald concerning these “presumptively lawful” regulations,4 rather than 
conducting the historical inquiry the Court ostensibly demands. Other judges 
have simply ignored the Court’s rejection of balancing tests. Instead, they have 
allowed the right to keep and bear arms to be gobbled up by intermediate 
scrutiny or similar tests that weigh serious, important, or compelling 
government interests against Second Amendment commands.5 
This Article argues that these lower court efforts to fashion a test simply 
cannot be squared with the Court’s insistence on historical fidelity, its rejection 
of balancing, and the preservation of most reasonable firearm regulations. It 
assumes that the Court is serious when it instructs lower courts to avoid tests 
that call for any balancing at all, even if that means, as some lower court judges 
have said, eliminating the traditional levels-of-scrutiny analysis in Second 
                                                                
1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual the 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home). 
2. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is 
incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause). 
3. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 & n.26. 
4. See id. (identifying certain “longstanding prohibitions” as examples in a nonexhaustive list 
of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures”); see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 
(stating that the Court’s holdings in both Heller and McDonald “[do] not cast doubt on such 
longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27)); infra Section I.A. 
5. See infra Section I.B.  
  
the yale law journal 122:852   2013  
856 
 
Amendment cases.6 It suggests that one way of reexamining the riddle is to 
refer to the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, one of the most 
historically determined of constitutional provisions.7 
The Seventh Amendment requires that federal courts “preserve[]”8 a 
preexisting right to a jury in suits at common law. In much the same way, the 
Court has stated that the Second Amendment preserves a “pre-existing” right 
to keep and bear arms for the core purpose of self-defense.9 Simultaneously, 
the Seventh Amendment does not operate with traditional levels of scrutiny or 
open-ended balancing; and yet, the “preserved” right to a trial by jury does not 
require that every detail of 1791 common law be transposed to the twenty-first 
century.10 
Instead of levels of scrutiny or balancing, the Court has devised a 
“historical test” for the Seventh Amendment. The Court’s historical test places 
great, but not exclusive, reliance on analogical reasoning from text, common 
law history, or tradition to determine the constitutionality of any given practice 
or regulation. That process of reasoning by historical analogy drives the 
Seventh Amendment inquiry in a way that far surpasses the Court’s approach 
to other provisions in the Bill of Rights. As such, the Court’s historical test for 
the Seventh Amendment offers lessons, but also presents its own set of 
problems, for lower courts struggling to implement the Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms.11 
                                                                
6. See Houston v. City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir.) (Elrod, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting standards-of-scrutiny analysis in Second Amendment cases), opinion withdrawn 
and superseded on reh’g by 682 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller 
II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1280-81 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Darrell A.H. 
Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 939, 967 (2011)); Gowder v. 
City of Chicago, No. 11-CV-1304, 2012 WL 2325826, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2012) 
(arguing that Heller and McDonald require a historical approach). 
7. My argument is not intended to be particularly normative. Although I believe that any 
Second Amendment test will have to contend with history, I am not certain that the Court 
will abandon levels of scrutiny in its ultimate articulation of a test. Instead, this Article 
assumes that the Court is serious in its demand for a test that minimizes or eliminates 
balancing and explores what such a test might look like and what benefits and hazards 
might accompany it. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
9. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second 
Amendment . . . codified a pre-existing right.”). 
10. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (stating that the Seventh Amendment 
does not include the common law tradition of a twelve-member jury); Galloway v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943) (stating that the Seventh Amendment does not require all 
the “procedural incidents” of the common law jury); see also infra Subsection II.A.2.  
11. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[T]he proper interpretive 
approach [in Second Amendment cases involving new weapons or circumstances] is to 
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This Article is likely to appeal to lawyers, judges, and scholars amenable to 
a new approach to Second Amendment questions, one that reduces judicial 
reliance on hotly disputed empirical evidence surrounding the right to keep 
and bear arms, but one that also avoids a calcified method that is unable to 
address the realities of modern firearm technology and culture.12 The Court’s 
implementation of the Seventh Amendment provides a counterintuitive but 
important resource in this regard. The Justices appear to have reached 
consensus that the Seventh Amendment’s text demands a level of historical 
engagement13 that exceeds what other, more open-textured provisions of the 
Bill of Rights require.14 They also all appear to agree that it is untenable to 
woodenly “preserve” the common law right to a jury trial as it existed in 1791.15 
As a consequence, the Court has converged on a historical test that attempts to 
remain true to the text, history, and tradition of the Seventh Amendment, but is 
supple enough to address the demands of a twenty-first-century judicial system. 
The Court’s effort to implement the Seventh Amendment through a 
historical test is instructive because Heller and McDonald appear to commit the 
Court to a similar history-centered approach in Second Amendment cases. All 
members of the Court seem wary of literal application of the text,16 but the 
                                                                                                                                                          
reason by analogy from history and tradition.”); see also Houston, 675 F.3d at 451-52 (Elrod, 
J., dissenting) (discussing Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in Heller II); Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (noting that, at oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts remarked 
on the “lineal descendents” of constitutionally protected arms as well as constitutionally 
permissible regulations). 
12. Second Amendment scholarship is currently awash in speculation about what level of 
scrutiny will ultimately govern Second Amendment challenges. See, e.g., Lawrence 
Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, Colloquy Debate, McDonald v. Chicago, Which Standard of 
Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 439 & n.12 (2011) 
(stating that commentators are “sharply divided” on the correct form of scrutiny and 
providing citations). Few judges or scholars, however, have been able to deviate from the 
traditional three-tiered standards of review, and even fewer appear to take seriously the 
Court’s avowed rejection of tests that require the idiosyncratic weighing of government 
interests. See infra Section I.A. 
13. See infra Section II.B.  
14. See infra Subsection II.A.2. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VII (requiring the jury right to be 
“preserved”), with U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring “just” compensation for takings), and 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (forbidding “cruel and unusual” punishment).  
15. See infra Subsection II.A.2 (discussing how the Court has expanded the coverage of the 
Seventh Amendment to causes of action that did not exist in 1791 and has permitted new 
forms of procedure that depart from late eighteenth-century common law traditions). 
16. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (stating that the Second 
Amendment is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose”); id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
protection the Amendment provides is not absolute . . . .”). For more on the strict 
grammatical meaning of the terms “keep,” “bear,” and “arms,” see infra Subsection III.A.1. 
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Heller majority and dissents differ on the method of establishing limits. The 
Heller majority insists that the scope of the right is to be determined by history, 
and they categorically reject the dissenters’ use of balancing tests.17 But they 
refuse to explain how such a history-centered test may operate in litigation. To 
the extent that the Court is serious about rejecting balancing and embracing 
history, “borrowing”18 from the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence 
can provide clues about how courts may craft a history-centered test for the 
Second Amendment. 
This Article is likely to appeal on a broader scale as well. The Seventh 
Amendment, the Second Amendment, and other areas of constitutional law 
present challenges about how one can create a jurisprudence from the reliquary 
of history that is both durable and principled. Those challenges include: 
Whose history do we consult when construing constitutional text? How much 
history do we consult? What do we do when history does not give us a clear 
answer? And, in particular, what rules govern when, and at what level of 
generality, to identify and examine a historical analogue for purposes of 
constitutional decisionmaking? These questions are as old as the Constitution 
itself.19 But they have acquired particular salience in the last twenty years, as 
                                                                
17. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35 (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were 
understood to have when the people adopted them . . . .”); see also infra Section I.A, 
Subsection III.A.2. 
18. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463 
(2010) (defining constitutional borrowing as “an interpretive practice characterized by a 
deliberate effort to bridge disparate constitutional fields for persuasive ends”).  
19. In 1799, for example, James Madison raised the following questions on how to construe the 
term “common law” as it applied to constitutional text:  
Is it to be the common law with or without the British statutes? 
. . . . 
[W]hat period is to be fixed for limiting the British authority over our laws?  
Is it to be the date of the eldest or the youngest of the Colonies? 
Or are the dates to be thrown together and a medium deduced? 
Or is our independence to be taken for the date? 
Is . . . regard to be had to the various changes in the common law made by the 
local codes of America? 
Is regard to be had to such changes, subsequent as well as prior to the 
establishment of the Constitution? 
Is regard to be had to future as well as to past changes? 
Is the law to be different in every State as differently modified by its code, or are 
the modifications of any particular State to be applied to all?  
. . . . 
Questions of this sort might be multiplied with as much ease as there would be 
difficulty in answering them. 
  JAMES MADISON, Report on the Resolutions, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 341, 379 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906); see also Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 
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scholars both inside and outside the interpretive movement known as 
“originalism” try to use common law traditions to give text determinate 
meaning, not only in Second20 and Seventh Amendment cases,21 but also in 
other areas of constitutional law22 and theory.23 For those engaging with these 
questions, this Article is also likely to be of interest. 
 The Article progresses as follows: Part I discusses the incompatible 
demands that the Court’s Heller and McDonald decisions place on lower courts. 
Specifically, it considers the demand that judges conduct a meticulous 
historical evaluation of the Second Amendment’s text and context, reject 
balancing tests, and yet preserve a nonexhaustive list of presumably 
constitutional restrictions on firearms. Part II explores how the Court has 
developed a Seventh Amendment doctrine designed to preserve the right to a 
trial by jury at common law in its essential features, but which remains 
sufficiently flexible to deal with the demands of the modern civil justice system. 
Assuming the Court is serious about a history-centered approach to the Second 
Amendment, Part III explains how “constitutional borrowing”24—drawing on 
                                                                                                                                                          
59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 574 (2006) (quoting and discussing same). 
20. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 325 (2009) (critiquing originalism as applied in Heller); Lawrence B. Solum, District of 
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009) (cataloguing varieties of 
originalism and their use in Heller). 
21. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Originalism and Summary Judgment, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 919 
(2010) (discussing Seventh Amendment originalism and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 139 (2007) (discussing originalist theories of the Seventh Amendment). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (using eighteenth-century 
trespass law to determine the minimum content of the word “search” in the Fourth 
Amendment); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1739 (2000) (discussing originalist theories of the Fourth Amendment); see also 
Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power To Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An 
Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477 (1998) (conducting an originalist inquiry into 
color-conscious federal laws). 
23. These same questions drive the debate about the nature and very identity of originalism, 
from “Originalism 1.0” to “Originalism 2.0” and beyond. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are 
Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2011) (using these descriptors for originalism and discussing the 
different points of division between and among these theories); see also, e.g., Thomas B. 
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011) (arguing that “New 
Originalism” is substantially more defensible than “Old Originalism,” but that this benefit 
has come at the expense of judicial restraint); Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism 
and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 711 (2011) (arguing that originalists’ rejection 
of the claims of “‘new new originalists’ . . . undermine[s] their claims to neutrality”). 
24. See generally Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 463 (offering a definition of “constitutional 
borrowing”). 
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the Seventh Amendment’s historical test—could help to implement the Second 
Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. In particular, it explains how the 
Court’s historical test for the Seventh Amendment can help structure an 
analysis of three reoccurring post-Heller issues: (1) the kinds of behavior that 
trigger Second Amendment protection; (2) the kinds of regulations that qualify 
as an infringement of that right, assuming the behavior falls within the scope 
of the Second Amendment; and (3) the character of judicially cognizable 
material to determine (1) and (2). Part III demonstrates how holistic 
constitutional interpretation, the Court’s stated methodological commitments, 
and the challenge of reasoning by analogy in Second Amendment cases can 
justify borrowing from Seventh Amendment doctrine, which represents one of 
the few history-centered methodologies available in the constitutional canon. It 
then explores what a historical test might look like for purposes of the Second 
Amendment, assuming the Court’s methodological commitments hold fast. 
Part IV outlines the potential benefits of this approach, notes its limitations, 
and recognizes that while the Seventh Amendment historical test may help 
resolve some difficulties in implementing the Second Amendment, it may 
aggravate others.  
i .  heller ’s  riddle  
In District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, a five-to-four 
majority of the Supreme Court held that the right to keep and bear arms for 
self-defense in the home is a fundamental individual right that applies equally 
to federal, state, and local governments.25 These decisions marked the end of 
several decades of public and often acrimonious debate about the meaning of 
the Second Amendment. Unfortunately, having announced the right, the 
Court has offered little instruction as to its administration. With no clear 
agreement on a test, the Court’s pronouncements have tended toward the 
sententious26 or the oracular.27 Lower courts, perplexed and without the luxury 
                                                                
25. Although McDonald is a plurality decision with respect to the manner of incorporating the 
Second Amendment against the states, its holding that the Amendment applies to state 
governments commanded a five-Justice majority. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. 
Ct. 3020, 3058-59 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(agreeing with the incorporation of the Second Amendment, but through the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause).  
26. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (“The very enumeration of the 
[Second Amendment] right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch 
of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth 
insisting upon.”). 
27. Id. at 636 (“The Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for 
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of a discretionary docket, have permitted Second Amendment doctrine to edge 
ever nearer to that least satisfactory of all tests, intermediate scrutiny. This Part 
explores that progression.  
A. The High Court Challenge 
The text of the Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed.”28 In Heller, the Court stated that the right to 
keep and bear arms predates the Constitution (reflected in the language, “the 
right of the people . . . shall not be infringed”).29 According to the Court, the 
right is a legacy from our English forebears.30 Its lineage can be traced back to 
the Declaration of Right in England in the seventeenth century31 and to 
Blackstone’s Commentaries.32 Some of the Court’s more sweeping passages 
suggest that it would be a pre-political and natural right, even if it had not been 
recognized in the text of the Second Amendment.33 
Methodologically, the Court purports to require the most exacting 
historical inquiry into any question concerning the right to keep and bear 
                                                                                                                                                          
combating th[e] problem [of handgun violence] . . . . But the enshrinement of 
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”); see also 
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (assuring municipalities that the Second Amendment “does not 
imperil every law regulating firearms”). 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
29. Id. (emphasis added); see Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“[I]t has always been widely understood 
that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing 
right. The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the 
right and declares only that it ‘shall not be infringed.’”). 
30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593 (“By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become 
fundamental for English subjects.”); id. at 599 (stating that the Second Amendment codified 
“a right ‘inherited from our English ancestors’” (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 
275, 281 (1897))). 
31. Id. at 593. 
32. Id. at 593-94. 
33. Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136, *139-40; and BOSTON UNDER 
MILITARY RULE (1768-1769): AS REVEALED IN A JOURNAL OF THE TIMES 79 (Oliver Morton 
Dickerson ed., 1936), which refer to the right as natural); Michael Steven Green, Why 
Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of the Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 131, 136 (2008) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s opinion suggests that the right to keep 
and bear arms is natural and would have restricted government even if the Framers had not 
specifically included it in the Constitution). For a discussion of how Heller uses natural law 
in its textual construction, see Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American 
Tradition, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1523-26 (2011). 
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arms.34 Commentators across the political spectrum generally acknowledge that 
the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence, especially Heller, constitutes 
the apogee of originalism.35 The originalist inquiry requires that lower courts 
evaluate constitutional terms like “keep” or “bear” or “arms” in light of 
historical sources and context.36 The Court also appears to forbid judges from 
resolving any question about the scope of the Second Amendment by weighing 
government interests. As Justice Alito wrote in McDonald, “[W]e expressly 
reject[] the argument that the scope of the Second Amendment right should be 
determined by judicial interest balancing . . . .”37 Justice Scalia in Heller insisted 
that no open-ended government interest analysis is permissible because the 
                                                                
34. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (stating that the 
operative question in incorporation analysis is whether the right is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition” (citation omitted)); Heller, 554 U.S. at 579-95 (examining 
the meaning of the Second Amendment’s operative clause in light of eighteenth-century 
vocabulary and usage); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(observing that “historical meaning enjoys a privileged interpretative role in the Second 
Amendment context” (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 625-26)); United States v. Tooley, 717 F. 
Supp. 2d 580, 584 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (discussing the Court’s historical inquiry and 
standard of review in Heller); see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2503 
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the Petition Clause 
of the First Amendment was intended to codify a “pre-existing individual right, which 
means that we must look to historical practice to determine its scope” (citing Heller, 554 U.S. 
at 579, 592)). But see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030-31 (declining to use the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause to incorporate the Second 
Amendment). 
35. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2009) (calling Heller “the 
most thoroughgoing originalist opinion in the Court’s history”); Nelson Lund, The Second 
Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1353 (2009) (noting 
that one passage from Heller is “almost enough to make an originalist stand up and cheer”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
246, 249 (2008) (referring to Heller as a “thoroughly originalist opinion”); see also Adam 
Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1558-59 (2009) (discussing reactions to 
Heller). McDonald v. City of Chicago may present a retreat from that originalist commitment. 
The Court opted for a more prudential course when presented with a chance to overturn a 
long-maligned construction of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
See Neil S. Siegel, Prudentialism in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 16, 18-21 (2010) (noting the Court’s disdain for deciding McDonald 
based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause); cf. Greene, supra note 20, at 326 (observing that 
“even if Heller is a triumph for originalism, it might also be its high water mark”). 
36. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (observing that future cases will expand (and expound) upon the 
“historical justifications” for exceptions to Second Amendment protection); see also 
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036-38 (relying on Heller and discussing the historical 
understanding of the right to keep and bear arms); Heller, 554 U.S. at 579-94 (using 
historical sources to discern the meaning of the Second Amendment right). 
37. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (referring to the Court’s decision in Heller). 
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Second Amendment right “is the very product of an interest balancing” that 
occurred at the Founding.38 
Finally, the Court cautioned that its decisions should not have any effect on 
a list of “presumptively lawful” regulations.39 These regulations include 
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”40 The Court did not describe 
what constitutes a “sensitive place,” which “conditions and qualifications” are 
constitutional as opposed to an infringement on constitutional rights, or even 
how one determines whether a regulation is lawful or not. Furthermore, this 
list is not exhaustive.41 Other, unidentified regulations could fall within the 
“presumptively lawful” category, but the Court has decided to wait for future 
litigation to identify them. 
The Court has thus left us with a jurisprudential puzzle: What Second 
Amendment test is faithful to history, rejects balancing, and keeps most 
existing regulations intact? It appears that no test can simultaneously satisfy all 
three requirements.42 The Court demands fidelity to history. It also demands 
that most existing regulations be preserved. But, as commentators observe, the 
specific examples of “longstanding” regulations offered by the Court are not all 
that longstanding. Many of them were unknown in 1791.43 For example, 
restrictions on gun possession by felons or the mentally ill appear to be 
twentieth-century innovations rather than relics of historical practice.44 The 
                                                                
38. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. In Heller, Justice Scalia hedged as to whether traditional standards of 
scrutiny analysis would suffice. Id. at 628-29 & n.27, 634. Justice Alito in McDonald appears 
much more resolute. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047. As discussed below, however, even 
traditional modes of scrutiny contain balancing analysis. See infra Section I.B. 
39. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26.  
40. Id. at 626-27. 
41. Id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; 
our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”). 
42. See Nelson Lund, Second Amendment Standards of Review in a Heller World, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 20) (describing Heller as “so Delphic, or muddled” 
that it cannot supply clear answers to what standard of review to apply), http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2022011. 
43. Lund, supra note 35, at 1356-58 (questioning the historical provenance of restrictions on 
felons’ access to guns); Winkler, supra note 35, at 1563 (noting the relatively recent origin of 
restrictions on firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill, and in certain “sensitive 
place[s]”). 
44. Rory K. Little, Heller and Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism’s Last Gasp, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1415, 1427 (2009) (noting that while these exceptions “draw[] on commonsense and 
modern-day experience,” as a matter of originalist jurisprudence, they “come[] entirely out 
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provenance of age requirements is similarly murky.45 It remains unclear how 
history is to be used to determine what regulations are presumptively lawful or 
longstanding.46 
The Court also says that the history of the right to keep and bear arms 
shows that the right is fundamental and not subject to interest balancing.47 But 
traditional tests for many fundamental rights are, in fact, balancing tests.48 
Speech, bodily integrity, and voting are all fundamental rights. These 
fundamental rights are evaluated by reference to levels of scrutiny.49 And all 
traditional levels of scrutiny50 require some explicit evaluation of  
the government interest. Strict scrutiny, for example, requires that a regulation 
be “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling [g]overnment interest.”51 
Intermediate scrutiny requires that a regulation be “substantially related to an 
important governmental objective.”52 As Judge Kavanaugh wrote in his recent 
dissent in Heller II, these familiar types of scrutiny “involve at least some 
                                                                                                                                                          
of thin air”). 
45. See United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (exploring Founding-era attitudes 
toward juveniles and noting “some evidence” that, in the Founding era, children would have 
been restricted from gun ownership on the basis that they lacked sufficient “virtue”). 
46. For example, it remains to be seen how history can help determine the constitutionality of 
regulations on arsenals possessed by private business corporations, see Darrell A.H. Miller, 
Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 934-37 (2011), or forbidding firearms on airplanes, 49 U.S.C. § 46505 
(2006). 
47. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008). 
48. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Strict and 
intermediate scrutiny are balancing tests and thus are necessarily encompassed by Heller’s 
more general rejection of balancing.”); see also Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1405 (11th Cir. 
1993) (describing the Supreme Court’s approach to ballot-access cases as “a balancing test 
that ranges from strict scrutiny to a rational-basis analysis”); Competello v. LaBruno, No. 
Civ.A. 02-664, 2005 WL 1637907, at *12 (D.N.J. July 12, 2005) (calling intermediate scrutiny 
“essentially a balancing test”). 
49. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (speech); Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (voting); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 
(1990) (bodily integrity). 
50. Traditional “levels” or “tiers” of scrutiny fall into three general types: strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (describing these levels as 
“traditional[]”). 
51. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (emphasis added). 
52. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (emphasis added). A third type of scrutiny, rational 
basis review, requires only that a regulation “be rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose.” Id. The Court has flatly rejected rational basis scrutiny for core 
Second Amendment rights. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. 
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assessment of whether the law in question is sufficiently important to justify 
infringement . . . . That’s balancing.”53 
The Heller and McDonald majorities appear reluctant to permit judges to 
conduct any balancing,54 even using these traditional modes of scrutiny.55 
(Judge Kavanaugh takes this position in Heller II and other judges have  
echoed his conclusion.56) Given the majorities’ reluctance to apply even  
well-established modes of scrutiny in Heller and McDonald, it is likely they will 
be even more skeptical of exotic new balancing tests in Second Amendment 
cases.57 Even more perplexing, the quintessential government interest, public 
                                                                
53. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1282 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
54. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (“The very enumeration of the 
right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the 
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.” 
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634)). 
55. Justice Scalia, for one, believes these tests are susceptible to judicial manipulation. See 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“These tests are 
no more scientific than their names suggest, and a further element of randomness is added 
by the fact that it is largely up to us which test will be applied in each case.”). Chief Justice 
Roberts, both before and after his elevation to the Court, has repeatedly criticized tests with 
“‘open-ended rough-and-tumble . . . factors’ which ‘invit[e] complex argument in a trial 
court and a virtually inevitable appeal.’” FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 
(2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547 (1995)). For a discussion of the Roberts Court’s application of 
this jurisprudence, see Joseph Blocher, Roberts’ Rules: Assertiveness and Rules-Based 
Jurisprudence, 46 TULSA L. REV. 431 (2011). Professor Blocher observes that Chief Justice 
Roberts disparaged “open-ended” tests more than half a dozen times while in appellate 
practice. Id. at 431. 
56. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating that these cases “leave little 
doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on text, history, and 
tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny”); see also Houston v. 
City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir.) (Elrod, J., dissenting) (same (citing Heller 
II, 670 F.3d at 1271)), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g by 682 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 
2012); Gowder v. City of Chicago, No. 11-CV-1304, 2012 WL 2325826, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 
19, 2012) (endorsing a “text, history and tradition” approach). 
57. For example, in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., Justice Scalia wrote an opinion, 
joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, in which he mocked the majority’s  
abortion-related speech test as “intermediate-intermediate scrutiny.” 512 U.S. 753, 791 
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Compare 
Madsen with efforts to identify new levels of scrutiny for the Second Amendment, such as 
Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1133 
(2000), which advocates “‘semi-strict’ scrutiny”; Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations 
After Heller: Speculation About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1426, 1429-30 
(2009), which suggests that lower courts will apply a “rational basis with bite” standard of 
review; and Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1571-74 (2009), which opts for 
“deferential strict scrutiny.” Patrick Charles has contributed to this discussion by proposing 
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safety,58 has no special bearing on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms. 
At least, it appears to have no more bearing on the Second Amendment’s scope 
than it does on any other constitutional right.59 So, even if a court were to 
analyze a certain regulation using a forbidden balancing test, it is unclear what 
weight, if any, public safety adds to the scale. 
At first blush, there appears to be no test that can simultaneously remain 
faithful to history, keep judges from balancing, and justify the existing set of 
presumptively lawful regulations, much less maintain other regulations that 
have developed in the last two centuries or that will develop in the future. And, 
much to the consternation of the Heller and McDonald dissenters,60 the Court 
has offered few hints as to a solution. 
B. The Lower Court Response 
The Court has left lower court judges at sea. Inundated by Second 
Amendment litigation,61 lower courts have been forced to rig what test they can 
from fragments of Heller’s and McDonald’s hundred-plus pages. Their product, 
created with little guidance and few resources, often betrays their haste. 
                                                                                                                                                          
a combination of “historical guideposts” with conventional levels of scrutiny. Patrick J. 
Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald: “Historical Guideposts” 
and the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 7, 
76 (2010) (arguing for a threshold historical-guideposts test, but not disputing that 
traditional standards of scrutiny analysis will apply). 
58. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling public safety “a primary concern 
of every government” (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987))).  
59. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045 (noting that “all constitutional provisions that impose 
restrictions on law enforcement” can be said to have “controversial public safety 
implications”). 
60. Id. at 3105 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the McDonald Court failed to “at least 
moderate the confusion [caused by Heller] . . . by adopting a rule that is clearly and tightly 
bounded in scope”); id. at 3126-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (raising a set of hypotheticals the 
Court has yet to resolve in Second Amendment cases). 
61. Id. at 3105 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (warning that Heller “unleashed . . . a tsunami of legal 
uncertainty, and thus litigation”); Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun 
Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1041, 1063 (2009) (referring to Heller as a “litigation magnet”); Robert Barnes, Cases Lining 
Up To Ask Supreme Court To Clarify Second Amendment Rights, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/cases-lining-up-to-ask-supreme-court-to-clarify 
-second-amendmentrights/2011/08/11/gIQAioihFJ_story.html (discussing the Second 
Amendment litigation now percolating through the courts). 
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Some judges have clung to the Court’s exclusionary dicta.62 When 
convicted felons assert Second Amendment defenses, for example, judges often 
simply parrot Heller’s dicta and move on.63 In United States v. Small, for 
example, a court cited Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful” regulations and 
concluded that the regulation at issue in the instant felon-in-possession case 
qualified.64 Other judges have assumed the Heller dicta’s nonexclusivity is an 
opportunity to add other categories to the list. In Nordyke v. King, for instance, 
a panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld laws concerning gun shows on public 
property by stating that certain “open public spaces” on municipal property 
could “fit comfortably within the same category as schools and government 
buildings.”65 
Increasingly, judges have latched onto intermediate scrutiny in Second 
Amendment cases.66 They have done so despite the current Court’s jaundiced 
                                                                
62. Some courts say the exceptions are not dicta. E.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 171 
(3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010). Others say 
they are dicta, but follow them nonetheless. E.g., United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 
451 (5th Cir. 2010). For an argument that these exceptions are binding, see Carlton F.W. 
Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse 
Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1372 (2009), which suggests that “[a]lthough these exceptions 
are arguably dicta, they are dicta of the strongest sort” and that “[f]or all practical purposes, 
these [exceptions] have been decided . . . in favor of constitutionality.” 
63. As one court observed: “Where a challenged statute apparently falls into one of the 
categories signaled by the Supreme Court as constitutional, courts have relied on the 
‘presumptively lawful’ language to uphold laws in relatively summary fashion.” Hall v. 
Garcia, No. 10-CV-03799, 2011 WL 995933, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (upholding state 
restrictions on firearms near schools); see also United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 
(9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that Heller’s exceptions are not dicta and instead constitute a 
binding determination that “felons are categorically different” from rights-bearing 
individuals); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a 
statute prohibiting a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from 
possessing a firearm or ammunition falls within Heller’s “presumptively lawful” category); 
United States v. Roy, 742 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D. Me. 2010) (citing language from Heller 
and McDonald to uphold firearm restrictions imposed on a person involuntarily committed 
for mental illness); Epps v. State, 55 So. 3d 710, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (dismissing a 
challenge to a state felon-in-possession conviction based on exclusionary dicta). 
64. No. CR-10-91-02, 2011 WL 379174, at *1 (D. Mont. Feb. 3, 2011) (applying dicta from Heller 
to a felon-in-possession Second Amendment challenge). 
65. 563 F.3d 439, 460 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding for 
consideration in light of McDonald); see also United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (suggesting that persons subject to domestic relations restraining orders are 
categorically like the mentally ill and felons for purposes of Second Amendment analysis). 
But cf. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734-35 (2011) (refusing to create a 
new harmful-to-minors category of unprotected speech). 
66. See Lund, supra note 42 (manuscript at 9) (noting that courts have tended to use 
intermediate scrutiny for Second Amendment cases dealing with regulations that do not 
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view of balancing tests in general, and intermediate scrutiny in particular.67 In 
United States v. Skoien,68 an en banc Seventh Circuit held, without diving into 
the “‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire,”69 that a federal law disarming domestic 
violence misdemeanants had “a substantial relation” to the “important 
governmental objective” of “preventing armed mayhem.”70 A judge in  
the Eastern District of New York acknowledged that “it is possible that an 
entirely new test [for the Second Amendment] will develop.”71 But the judge 
felt “bound”72 to apply the “existing analytical frameworks”73 to the federal 
felon-in-possession statute, and upheld the statute as “substantially related to 
the important goal of promoting public safety.”74 Another judge in the 
Northern District of California upheld state restrictions on firearms within one 
thousand feet of a school on the ground that the restriction was “substantially 
related” to the “important governmental objective” of preventing harm to 
children.75 These judges have yet to engage with McDonald’s suggestion that 
                                                                                                                                                          
severely restrict the core rights). Intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny appear to be the 
only alternatives left standing after the Court’s rejection of rational basis scrutiny for core 
rights in Heller. Professor Kathleen Sullivan has described intermediate scrutiny as “an 
overtly balancing mode.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of 
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 (1992). 
67. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (rejecting balancing 
tests for the Second Amendment). Elsewhere, Justice Scalia has criticized “intermediate 
scrutiny” as the test the Court applies “when it seems like a good idea to load the dice.” 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also FEC v. 
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (criticizing tests 
with “open-ended rough-and-tumble” factors (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547 (1995))); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1273 n.5 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Heller Court intentionally refused to 
employ the intermediate scrutiny test based on the First Amendment). 
68. 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). 
69. Id. at 642. 
70. Id.; see also United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580, 592-93 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) 
(refusing to reconsider intermediate scrutiny as a proper test for prohibitions on 
misdemeanant domestic batterers in possession of firearms). 
71. United States v. Oppedisano, No. 09-CR-0305, 2010 WL 4961663, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 
30, 2010).  
72. Id. 
73. Id. at *2. 
74. Id. 
75. Hall v. Garcia, No. 10-CV-03799, 2011 WL 995933, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011). The 
Garcia court did not expressly adopt intermediate scrutiny; it applied this test assuming that 
the regulation survived “[u]nder any of the potentially applicable levels of scrutiny.” See id. 
at *4. 
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balancing is forbidden and that public safety plays no special role in Second 
Amendment suits. 
 Lured by more supple First Amendment analogues, some courts have 
fashioned a mixed category-plus-scrutiny approach.76 In United States v. 
Marzzarella,77 a panel of the Third Circuit created a two-tiered structure for 
Second Amendment challenges. Under this structure, the court first examines 
“whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”78 If it does, then the court 
proceeds to “some form of means-end scrutiny.”79 Applying this framework, 
the Third Circuit held that prohibitions on firearms with obliterated serial 
numbers fell within the scope of the Second Amendment. However, in 
addressing the issue of means-end fit, the court concluded that the law was 
reasonably related to the important government interest of tracing guns for 
law-enforcement purposes.80 
                                                                
76. Professor Eugene Volokh is the leading proponent of this approach. See Eugene Volokh, 
Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a 
Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009) [hereinafter Volokh, Implementing the Right]; 
see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict 
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996); cf. Lund, supra note 42 (manuscript at 10) (noting 
that lower courts have tended to apply First Amendment scrutiny analysis when “faced with 
harder cases”). I have used First Amendment analogies as well, but as a way to explain how 
the Court might craft a more category-based approach to the Second Amendment’s scope. 
See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second 
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009) (articulating a category-based approach to the 
Second Amendment based on First Amendment obscenity doctrine). The current Court 
does not seem to favor the more mutable forms of First Amendment scrutiny. See Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Court 
should “avoid wherever possible” constitutional tests that require judges to assess 
government interests); Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) (question of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that the tiers of 
scrutiny are not in the Constitution and referring to them as First Amendment “baggage”), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-290.pdf. Even the 
much-vaunted “time, place, and manner” or O’Brien First Amendment tests are understood 
to be balancing tests. See Sullivan, supra note 66, at 297. 
77. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
78. Id. at 89. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 98.  
  
the yale law journal 122:852   2013  
870 
 
More often than not, the burden of “doing originalism”81 collapses these 
two-step tests into one step: intermediate scrutiny. The Fourth Circuit, in 
United States v. Chester,82 claimed to apply the two-part Marzzarella test to 
domestic violence misdemeanants. But it concluded that history provided no 
definitive answers as to whether the possession of firearms by misdemeanants 
was within the original understanding of the Second Amendment.83 It 
therefore moved on to the second part of the test. Finding (in apparent 
contradiction to its earlier conclusion) that a right of misdemeanant domestic 
batterers to possess firearms was “not within the core right identified in 
Heller,”84 it held that “intermediate scrutiny” applied to misdemeanants like 
Chester.85 In United States v. Reese,86 the Tenth Circuit addressed federal 
firearms restrictions imposed on persons subject to restraining orders.87 
Purporting to follow Marzzarella’s two-step approach, the Reese court 
performed little investigation into the history of gun bans among those subject 
to restraining orders.88 Instead, it upheld the prohibition almost entirely on the 
basis of intermediate scrutiny.89 
Few courts have explained how their approach complies with the Court’s 
insistence that no test rely on idiosyncratic evaluation of government 
                                                                
81. Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32 (2004). The phrase comes 
from Professor Monaghan, but what I mean by the term is the difficult task originalism 
demands of judges and litigants, untrained in history, who have to construct a legal opinion 
from conflicted and remote materials. This is a flaw that Justice Scalia recognizes: 
[I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an 
ancient text. Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous 
mass of material . . . . Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the reliability 
of that material . . . . And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the 
political and intellectual atmosphere of the time . . . and putting on beliefs, 
attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day. It is, 
in short, a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.  
  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856-57 (1989). 
82. 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010). 
83. Id. at 680-81. 
84. Id. at 683.  
85. Id. (remanding for further proceedings applying intermediate scrutiny); see also United 
States v. Lunsford, No. 2:10-cr-00182, 2011 WL 145195, at *5-6 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 18, 2011) 
(finding the historical evidence for felon dispossession disputable and looking to 
intermediate scrutiny to uphold a felon-in-possession statute). 
86. 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010). 
87. Id. at 799-800. 
88. See id. at 800-01 (summarily finding that the prohibition falls within the scope of Second 
Amendment protections). 
89. Id. at 802-04. 
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interests.90 Even fewer have delved into the historical materials that the Court 
says should guide any evaluation of the Second Amendment’s scope. Worse, 
the emerging consensus candidate—intermediate scrutiny—is a mode of 
analysis that many jurists and scholars disfavor and occasionally decry.91 Justice 
Scalia, for one, has signaled that “intermediate scrutiny” is not really much of a 
test at all, but frequently a way for judges to “load the dice.”92 And the colloquy 
between Justices Scalia and Breyer in Heller concerning the propriety of 
applying First Amendment-inspired balancing tests to Second Amendment 
cases suggests that the majority rejected intermediate scrutiny as a permissible 
method of analysis.93 Faced with the Court’s seemingly insoluble demands and 
the pressure of crowded dockets, some judges have responded to the challenge 
with the equivalent of an exasperated shrug.94 This is where an examination of 
the right to a civil jury can help. 
                                                                
90. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3045-46 (2010). Even those who urge a mixed 
category-and-scrutiny approach have yet to explain how their approach complies with the 
second element of the riddle, that is, that no test permit balancing of government interests. 
Compare Volokh, Implementing the Right, supra note 76, at 1470-73 (rejecting both 
intermediate scrutiny and different levels of burden tests, but adopting First Amendment 
time, place, manner, and substantial burden analogues), with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the Court 
should “avoid wherever possible” tests that require assessment of the importance of 
government interests), and Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (observing that the “clear message” of Heller and McDonald is that courts should 
not analyze Second Amendment cases using strict or intermediate scrutiny). 
91. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to the 
use of intermediate scrutiny); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (objecting to intermediate scrutiny as “diaphanous,” “elastic,” and an 
“invit[ation to] subjective judicial preferences”); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: 
Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 301 (1998) 
(observing that “intermediate scrutiny has been consistently critiqued by judges and 
scholars who point to its indeterminacy and its invitation to judicial activism”). 
92. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
93. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1282 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that Heller’s majority 
rejected all balancing, and rejected in particular Justice Breyer’s use of a form of First 
Amendment-like intermediate scrutiny). 
94. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring in part and in the judgment) (stating that “in this instance we believe the most 
respectful course is to await . . . guidance from the nation’s highest court” and encouraging 
the court to defer the issue of whether the Second Amendment protects a right to keep and 
bear arms outside of the home). 
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i i .  the seventh amendment text,  history,  and test  
Like the Second Amendment, the right to trial by jury in civil cases presents 
its own riddle. The Seventh Amendment reads: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.95 
What does it mean to “preserve” a right to trial by jury? More specifically, 
what does it mean to “preserve” the right to trial by jury “in [s]uits at common 
law”? And how does this fit with a society in which “the rules of the common 
law” have never been either standardized or static? 
This Part discusses the history of the Seventh Amendment and the Court’s 
efforts to implement its text. It explores how the Court has attempted to craft a 
Seventh Amendment test that is simultaneously faithful to text and history, 
avoids expressly balancing the right to a trial by jury against extraconstitutional 
demands, and yet is functional in a modern society. It concludes that the Court 
has fashioned a test that relies primarily on historical analogues to determine 
the kinds of suits that trigger a jury-trial right and the constitutionality of 
procedural innovations that control the jury. It notes that, in the end, the 
Court’s use of the historical test—and especially analogical reasoning from 
history—has stretched the Seventh Amendment’s protections to cover far more 
legal controversies than a strict reading of history would permit. But it has also 
expanded the government’s ability to alter the form and function of that jury 
from its historical roots. Part III will then explain how the Court may learn 
from its experience with the Seventh Amendment’s historical test in its effort 
to craft a historical approach to the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms. 
A. Seventh Amendment History, the Historical Test, and  
Some Initial Questions 
The right to a jury is enshrined in the Bill of Rights.96 That has not kept 
some scholars and tort reformers from regarding the jury with a skepticism 
                                                                
95. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  
96. Id. The Constitution also guarantees the right to a criminal jury trial. See id. amend. VI; see 
also id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
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that occasionally borders on contempt.97 As Dean Erwin Griswold sniffed: 
“The jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the amateur. Why should anyone 
think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for 
their lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding 
controversies between persons?”98 
This curdled attitude, irrespective of its veracity,99 would have surprised 
the Founding generation. While William Blackstone praised the right to keep 
arms in his Commentaries on the Laws of England,100 he fairly gushed about the 
right to a trial by jury. The jury was “the glory of the English law”;101 “the most 
transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy”;102 and “the best criterion, 
for investigating the truth of facts, that was ever established in any country.”103 
                                                                
97. As Jerome Frank wrote, “Is it likely that twelve men, summoned from all sorts of 
occupations, unaccustomed to the machinery of the law, unacquainted with their own 
mental workings and not known to one another can, in the scant time allowed them for 
deliberation, do as good a job in weighing conflicting testimony as an experienced judge?” 
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 193 (Transaction Publishers 2009) (1930). 
Lisa A. Rickard, President of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, recently issued a 
press release lambasting a multi-million dollar personal injury verdict as a “runaway verdict 
against companies that even the plaintiff admitted did not expose him to asbestos.” Press 
Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Reacts to Massive Illinois  
Asbestos Verdict (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2011/march/us 
-chamber-reacts-massive-illinois-asbestos-verdict; see also AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., 
JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2010), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12 
/JH2010.pdf (lamenting the size of jury verdicts in various jurisdictions in the United States 
and implying it is due to jurors’ inability to make rational, objective decisions). For an 
evaluation of this criticism, see NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE 
VERDICT (2007).  
98. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966) (quoting ERWIN 
GRISWOLD, 1962-1963 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN’S REPORT 5-6 (1963)). 
99. Studies of jury functions are numerous and disputed. See, e.g., id.; VIDMAR & HANS, supra 
note 97; Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 
MINN. L. REV. 703 (1992); Matthew A. Reiber & Jill D. Weinberg, The Complexity of 
Complexity: An Empirical Study of Juror Competence in Civil Cases, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 929 
(2010); Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1121 (2001). This Article takes no position on the competence of jurors to decide cases. 
100. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143 (“The fifth and last auxiliary right of the 
subject . . . is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, 
and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by [English statute] . . . and is indeed 
a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance an 
d self-preservation . . . .”). 
101. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at *379. 
102. Id.  
103. Id. at *385. 
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He traced its lineage, perhaps erroneously,104 at least as far back as the Magna 
Carta.105 
America’s Founders jealously guarded this English tradition.106 Thomas 
Jefferson, writing in 1789, regarded “trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet 
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its 
constitution.”107 Indeed, the entire American experiment nearly faltered in part 
because the original Constitution contained no right to trial by jury in civil 
matters.108 As the Court noted almost a century later, “Those who emigrated to 
this country from England brought with them this great privilege [the jury 
trial] ‘as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common 
law which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every side against the 
approaches of arbitrary power.’”109 It seems that the right to a jury, far more 
than the right to keep and bear arms, was originally understood to codify the 
ancient privileges of Englishmen and to serve as the chief bulwark against 
tyrannical government.110 
                                                                
104. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 639, 653 n.44 (1973). 
105. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at *350. 
106. Wolfram, supra note 104, at 656 (explaining that “the nascent American nation 
demonstrated at virtually every important step in its development” that it was “strongly 
attached” to the jury). 
107. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 97, at 16 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas 
Paine, 1789, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 408 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905)). 
108. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
289, 295 (1966) (noting that “the lack of provision for civil juries was a prominent part of” 
opposition to ratification of the Constitution); Wolfram, supra note 104, at 662, 672-73 
(discussing Anti-Federalists’ demands for a jury-trial right); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting the political success of 
arguments against ratifying the Constitution based on its initial lack of a civil jury right). 
109. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898). Although the Court was quoting here 
Story’s comments on the criminal jury, see 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1779, at 541 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873), 
Story himself noted that the civil jury’s placement in the Bill of Rights “places upon the high 
ground of constitutional right the inestimable privilege of a trial by jury in civil cases, a 
privilege scarcely inferior to that in criminal cases,” id. § 1768. 
110. See Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How To Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil 
Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1008-10 (1992) (summarizing the sentiments of Patrick 
Henry, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson on the civil jury, and concluding that “[t]he 
only disagreement seems to be over whether civil jury rights were the most important of all 
individual rights, or simply one of the most important rights”). For more on the history of 
the Seventh Amendment, see generally Wolfram, supra note 104. 
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The Seventh Amendment uses the word “preserved.”111 “Preserve,” as 
defined in the eighteenth century, means much the same thing as it does today: 
“to save; to defend from destruction or any evil; to keep.”112 The gravity of this 
term is difficult to escape.113 Even skeptics of the jury concede that the Seventh 
Amendment text demands some special attention to history.114 Accordingly, the 
Court has interpreted the Seventh Amendment’s text to command a “historical 
test.”115 Under this historical test, questions concerning the cases that demand a 
                                                                
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. In fact, the term appears only once in the Constitution, although 
“preserve” is part of the presidential oath of office. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. The Seventh 
Amendment is, in fact, composed of two provisions: the “preserved” provision, and the 
Reexamination Clause. The historical test, with variation as discussed infra, applies to the 
Amendment as a whole. 
112. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Dublin, W.G. Jones, 3d ed. 
1768); see also WILLIAM PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 408 (Boston, 
Thomas & Andrews, 1800) (defining preserve as “to save, defend”); 2 THOMAS SHERIDAN, A 
COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, Charles Dilly, in the Poultry 
3d ed. 1790) (same); cf. OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 527 (Eugene Ehrlich et al. eds., 
1980) (defining “preserve” as “to keep safe, to keep in an unchanged condition”). 
113. Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of 
Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 486 (1975) (noting that the “[u]se of this 
word has caused the seventh amendment to hold a unique position in the realm of 
constitutional interpretation”); Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil 
Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 671 (1918) (arguing that the meaning of the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury “must be ascertained by a resort to history”). In fact, some states 
limit their jury-trial right solely to those actions that existed at the time of its ratification. See 
OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 5 (stating that the right to a jury must remain “inviolate”); State ex rel. 
Russo v. McDonnell, 852 N.E.2d 145, 153 (Ohio 2006) (“There is no right to a jury trial . . . 
unless that right is extended by statute or existed at common law prior to the adoption of 
the Ohio Constitution.”); ANDERSON’S OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE § 174.02 (2010) (discussing the 
effect of the Ohio constitutional right to a jury, which applies to causes of action that existed 
before the state constitution’s adoption); see also GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, para. XI(a) (stating 
that the right to a jury trial is “inviolate”); Swails v. State, 431 S.E.2d 101, 103 (Ga. 1993) 
(stating that “[t]he right to a jury trial under [Georgia’s] Constitution is not as broad as that 
afforded under the Federal Constitution” and noting that no state constitutional right to a 
jury exists for actions that did not exist in 1798); Wertz v. Chapman Township, 741 A.2d 
1272, 1277-79 (Pa. 1999) (finding no jury right under the Pennsylvania state constitution for 
a cause of action that did not exist at the time of ratification). Thanks to Michael Solimine 
for this point. 
114. David L. Shapiro & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment 
on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 449-50 (1971) (acknowledging that history must be 
the starting point for understanding the jury-trial right). Professor Redish makes a more 
subtle point, that “because jury trial is inefficient, we should apply a strictly historical test.” 
Redish, supra note 113, at 489. As discussed in Part III, infra, these problems exist in Second 
Amendment adjudication as well. 
115. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (using this nomenclature 
(quoting Wolfram, supra note 104, at 640-43)). 
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jury, the composition of that jury, and what matters the jury must hear, are all 
answered by history. 
But this historical test raises another set of questions. Whose history is 
preserved in the Seventh Amendment? How much history? And what does a 
court do with conflicting or indeterminate history?116 In engaging with these 
questions of constitutional construction, the Court has compiled a record, one 
that may help frame a set of nearly identical issues regarding a historical 
approach to the Second Amendment. 
1. Whose History? 
As to the first question, whose common law history is preserved, the Court 
has held that the Constitution preserves English common law history, and not 
any particular state common law history. Justice Story articulated this aspect of 
the historical test while riding circuit in 1812.117 At the Founding, common law 
practice varied from state to state and region to region.118 In fact, the Federalists 
used the lack of uniformity of civil practice in the states as an argument against 
including the civil jury right in the original Constitution.119 
In United States v. Wonson,120 Justice Story concluded that “[b]eyond all 
question, the common law . . . alluded to [in the Seventh Amendment] is not 
the common law of any individual state, . . . but it is the common law of 
England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.”121 Courts since then have 
largely, but not uniformly,122 reaffirmed English common law as the Seventh 
Amendment’s touchstone.123 
                                                                
116. See Redish, supra note 113, at 486-87 (noting the difficulty of determining which legal 
situations required a jury trial in 1791); Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 114, at 448-49 
(asking “[w]hose law should one look to if such [a historical] examination is to be made”). 
117. Scholars trace this aspect of the historical test to Justice Story. See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, The 
Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 588 (2003); 
Wolfram, supra note 104, at 640-41. However, there are some dissenters. E.g., Margaret L. 
Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 189-90 (2000) (stating that the common 
understanding of the right to a civil jury trial as reliant on 1791 English common law history 
is a twentieth-century invention). 
118. Wolfram, supra note 104, at 665 (“[T]he provision of a civil jury varied widely among the 
several states.”). 
119. Id. at 662-63, 665. 
120. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).  
121. Id. at 750. 
122. For example, although the Court uses English common law as a benchmark, it has cited 
state analogues as persuasive authority for its conclusions. See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 
U.S. 300, 308-09 (1920) (looking to pre-revolutionary Maryland and Connecticut for 
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2. How Much History?  
The second question is how much common law history the Seventh 
Amendment preserves. This question has two components, one temporal and 
one substantive. The temporal component relates to the span of English 
common law history relevant to Seventh Amendment construction.124 That 
matter has been settled fairly definitively. The Court has stated that the 
Seventh Amendment preserves English common law as it existed in 1791, the 
date of its ratification.125 
But that leaves the thornier substantive problem. Assuming the Seventh 
Amendment preserves the common law of England as it existed in 1791, the 
Court must address how much of that common law is now constitutional law. 
As Professor James wrote over forty years ago, does the Seventh Amendment 
“freeze[] the right abso[lu]tely as it was in England in 1791”?126 Or does it have 
“some elasticity so as to accommodate extensions or contractions of jury trial 
and, if so, what [are] the limits of this elasticity”?127 Put another way, when is 
modification of 1791 jury practice—whether an expansion or diminution, 
whether through legislation, executive action, or common law reasoning—a 
constitutional violation? 
On this point, the Court is torn between its duty to the text and the reality 
of change. The Court frequently states that any departure from historical 
practice is unconstitutional. But it also tends to validate constitutional claims to 
                                                                                                                                                          
analogues); Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 597 (1897) (citing to state 
constitutional and legislative analogues to support the proposition that federal legislation 
does not violate the Seventh Amendment); see also Moses, supra note 117, at 189 
(“Nineteenth-century cases discussing the jury trial right and other constitutional 
issues . . . referred to the common law and practice in both [England and the United 
States].”). 
123. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (stating that 
English common law is preserved); Peterson, 253 U.S. at 309 n.4 (“The right to a jury trial 
guaranteed in the federal courts is that known to the law of England, not the jury trial as 
modified by local usage or statute.”); Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377-78 
(1913). But see Moses, supra note 117, at 189 (casting doubt on this understanding). 
124. See 6 MADISON, supra note 19, at 379 (“[W]hat period is to be fixed for limiting the British 
authority over our laws?”). 
125. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999). 
There still exists a smattering of opinions that cite 1789, the year in which the Amendment 
was proposed, but not ratified, as governing. Compare Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. 
Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935), with In re Clay, 35 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1994). For a 
discussion of Court decisions that have not adhered to the 1791 date, see Moses, supra note 
117, at 190-92. 
126. Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 657 (1963). 
127. Id. 
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a jury for suits that had no existence in 1791.128 Paradoxically, it also has upheld 
modern procedural innovations that actually diminish the jury, both as to its 
form and as to its function. As explained below, the result is a doctrine in 
which the Seventh Amendment covers more cases than it would have in 1791, 
but also permits greater government control over the jury that is ultimately 
empaneled. This Subsection explores that paradox. 
Sometimes the Court suggests that any deviation from 1791 common law 
practice is impermissible. In Dimick v. Schiedt,129 for instance, the Court 
addressed the question of whether the Seventh Amendment allows a federal 
judge to increase a jury award in lieu of granting a new trial.130 Justice 
Sutherland wrote that the “scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment” is 
determined by “the appropriate rules of the common law established at the 
time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.”131 The Court 
concluded that, while common law practice permitted English courts to modify 
damage awards, those modifications had largely been to decrease damages.132 
There was no corollary historical practice of courts increasing them.133 The 
Court recognized that “the common law is susceptible of growth and 
adaptation to new circumstances and situations.”134 But the Seventh 
Amendment had, according to the Court, codified certain elements of the 
common law as it existed in the eighteenth century.135 To depart from those 
historical common law elements, even by common law reasoning, was, in 
effect, “to alter the Constitution.”136  
                                                                
128. This is a significant difference from some state laws, which do not extend jury-trial rights to 
new forms of action. See supra note 113. 
129. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).  
130. The particular Seventh Amendment right here would be the freedom from “re-examination” 
of a fact tried by a jury. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. In this case, the judge and the 
defendant agreed to increase the award, rather than grant the plaintiff’s motion for a new 
trial. The plaintiff did not agree to this arrangement. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 476. No one 
doubted that the district court had the power to grant a new trial, or that as a matter of stare 
decisis the judge had the power to condition that decision on the plaintiff’s agreement to 
reduce (remit) a portion of the award. See id. at 476, 484-85.  
131. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 476. 
132. Id. at 482. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 487. 
135. As the Dimick Court noted, “Here, we are dealing with a constitutional provision which has 
in effect adopted the rules of the common law, in respect of trial by jury, as these rules 
existed in 1791.” Id. 
136. Id.; cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (suggesting that the Second 
Amendment text constrains case-by-case decisionmaking by the courts). 
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On the other hand, the Court has construed the Seventh Amendment to 
require a jury trial in causes of action unknown to the Framers. In Parsons v. 
Bedford, Justice Story, writing for the Court, observed that the Framers of the 
Seventh Amendment did not mean to restrict the jury to only those causes of 
action that existed in 1791.137 As he wrote, “Probably there were few, if any, 
states in the union, in which some new legal remedies differing from the old 
common law forms were not in use . . . .”138 Instead, the Framers used “[t]he 
phrase ‘common law,’ . . . in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and 
maritime jurisprudence.”139 Thus, the right to a jury “in cases at common law” 
is implicated both as to English common law in “its old and settled 
proceedings,”140 as well as newer causes of action “in which legal rights [as 
distinct from equitable] [are] to be ascertained and determined.”141 
Twentieth-century courts cited Parsons to find jury-trial rights for causes of 
action that were unknown in 1791. Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry142 is an 
excellent illustration and reveals fractures within the Court with respect to 
fidelity to history. In Terry, the Court considered whether a federal statute 
allowing union members to obtain back pay for breach of a union’s duty of fair 
representation triggered the right to a jury trial.143 The statute itself was silent 
on the matter.144 A plurality held that the Seventh Amendment commanded a 
jury trial.145 The Court reasoned from Parsons that “[t]he right to a jury trial 
includes more than the common-law forms of action recognized in 1791.”146 
The jury right “extends to causes of action created by Congress,”147 even when 
those causes of action were alien to the Framers.148 The essential question was 
                                                                
137. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830). But cf. State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 852 N.E.2d 145, 153 
(Ohio 2006) (holding that no jury right exists unless extended by statute or unless the right 
existed at common law); Sward, supra note 117, at 590 (noting that a “purely historical 
analysis” would guarantee a jury “only in those precise cases where a jury would have been 
available in 1791 England”).  
138. Parsons, 28 U.S. at 446. 
139. Id. at 447. 
140. Id. 
141. Id.  
142. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).  
143. See id. at 562-63. 
144. See id. at 562 (citing Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120 § 301, 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1947) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982))). 
145. Id. at 573.  
146. Id. at 564 (citing Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447).  
147. Id. at 564-65. 
148. See id. at 565-66 (observing that an action for breach of a union’s duty of fair representation 
was unknown in 1791 and that collective bargaining was actually unlawful).  
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whether the federal suit was equitable (in which case no jury would be 
required) or legal. 
The Terry plurality used a two-part mechanism for deciding Seventh 
Amendment cases. First, it employed an analogical process, whereby the Court 
“compare[d] the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts 
of England.”149 The Court’s task here was to see if the individual issues in a 
cause of action are more analogous to a 1791 suit brought in equity or a suit 
brought in law. Second, the Court “examine[d] the remedy sought and 
determine[d] whether it is legal or equitable in nature.”150 According to the 
Terry plurality, this second test is the most important.151 
The Terry Court reasoned that a fair-representation cause of action was 
analogous to either of two eighteenth-century suits: an equitable claim against 
a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty152 or a legal claim against a lawyer for 
malpractice or breach of contract.153 On balance, the plurality thought the trust 
analogy slightly more convincing for the case as a whole, but not for individual 
issues within the suit.154 The plurality insisted that the analogical portion of the 
historical test was only “preliminary.”155 Finding the analogical analysis placed 
the case in “equipoise,” the Court then moved onto the requested relief.156 It 
concluded that back pay, although equitable in other contexts, was, at its core 
in this case, a demand for legal rather than equitable relief.157 Accordingly, the 
Terry plaintiffs were entitled to a jury. 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Scalia and O’Connor, dissented. In 
their view, a departure from common law history violates the Seventh 
Amendment, regardless of whether the jury-trial right is contracted or 
expanded.158 For the Terry dissenters, the analogy to the trust was 
                                                                
149. Id. at 565 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987)). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
152. Id. at 567-68. 
153. Id. at 569-70 (“When viewed in isolation, the duty of fair representation issue is analogous 
to a claim against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty. The § 301 issue, however, is 
comparable to a breach of contract claim—a legal issue.”); id. at 573 (“[T]he search for an 
adequate 18th-century analog revealed that the claim includes both legal and equitable 
issues . . . .”). 
154. Id. at 569-70. 
155. Id. at 570 (citing Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 47). 
156. Id. at 569-71. 
157. Id. at 570-73.  
158. See id. at 592-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 
(1935) (stating that the Seventh Amendment text limits what the Court can do through 
common law analogical reasoning). 
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determinative.159 Justice Kennedy emphasized the Seventh Amendment’s 
textual command that the right be “preserved”; he warned that “[i]f we 
abandon the plain language of the Constitution to expand the jury right, we 
may expect Courts with opposing views to curtail it in the future.”160 The way 
to avoid such judicial manipulation is scrupulous adherence to history. “We 
cannot preserve a right existing in 1791,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “unless we 
look to history to identify it.”161 Echoing Dimick, any other result would 
“rewrit[e] the Constitution.”162 Justice Kennedy acknowledged the difficulty of 
historical proofs, but offered nothing short of an originalist manifesto in 
response: “Our obligation to the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, no less 
than the compact we have with the generation that wrote them for us, do[es] 
not permit us to disregard provisions that some may think to be mere matters 
of historical form.”163 
Ironically, the Court has long disregarded Justice Kennedy’s concern with 
historical form when it comes to the actual mechanics of adjudication. Indeed, 
the Court applies the historical test to procedural challenges with an extremely 
light touch. The Court has stated on numerous occasions that the Seventh 
Amendment does not bind the government to ancient procedure or practices. 
Instead, it prevents only those innovations that keep the jury from functioning 
in its most “fundamental elements.”164 
As early as 1897, the Court stated that “[the Seventh Amendment’s] aim is 
not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but substance of right.”165 
In Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad Co., a statute empowered a 
judge to enter judgment for a defendant, even though the general verdict was 
for the plaintiff, when the general verdict and the special findings of fact 
                                                                
159. Terry, 494 U.S. at 584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Having made this decision in favor of an 
equitable action, our inquiry should end.”). 
160. Id. at 593.  
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 594. 
164. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (holding that the Seventh Amendment only 
preserves incidents of trial deemed fundamental to the right); Galloway v. United States, 
319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) (same); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 
498 (1931) (stating that the Seventh Amendment is “concerned, not with [the] form, but 
with [the] substance” of the jury-trial right). 
165. Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897); see also Balt. & Carolina Line, 
Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (“The aim . . . is to preserve the substance of the 
common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished from mere matters of form or 
procedure . . . .”).  
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conflicted.166 The plaintiff argued that the most the judge could have done at 
common law in 1791 was to grant a new trial. In response, the Court asked 
rhetorically, “But why should the power of the court be thus limited?”167 The 
lack of precise historical analogue was no bar for this legislation. “So long as 
th[e] substance of [the jury] right is preserved,” the Court held, “the procedure 
by which this result shall be reached is wholly within the discretion of the 
legislature.”168 Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court in 1920, went further. In 
Ex parte Peterson, he found that a judge could refer questions to an “auditor” to 
“sharpen” the factual issues for the jury, even though no identical practice 
existed in 1791. “New devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution to 
present needs . . . . Indeed,” he ventured, “such changes are essential to the 
preservation of the right.”169 
In a majority opinion in 1931, Justice Stone flatly rejected the Terry 
dissenters’ faithfulness to historical form. In Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin 
Refining Co.,170 the Court considered whether the Seventh Amendment allowed 
an appellate court to remand for retrial only those issues on which the jury 
verdict was defective, or whether the entire matter had to be retried.171 The 
Court amassed a string of eighteenth-century citations that showed that “at 
common law there was no practice of setting aside a verdict in part. If the 
verdict was erroneous with respect to any issue, a new trial was directed as to 
all.”172 Quoting Lord Mansfield, the Court recognized the common law belief 
was that “for form’s sake, [a court] must set aside the whole verdict.”173 
Nevertheless, the Court found no Seventh Amendment violation. The common 
law may be concerned with form, Justice Stone declared, but “[i]t is the 
Constitution which we are to interpret; and the Constitution is concerned, not 
with form, but with substance.”174 The only issue of “vital significance” to the 
                                                                
166. See Walker, 165 U.S. at 595 (citing 1889 N.M. Laws 97). The law governed the New Mexico 
territories before they became a state, and hence implicated the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 
595-96. 
167. Id. at 598. 
168. Id. at 596.  
169. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920) (footnote omitted).  
170. 283 U.S. 494 (1931).  
171. Id. at 497. 
172. Id. (citing, among other cases, Parker v. Godin, (1728) 93 Eng. Rep. 866 (K.B.), 2 Strange 
813; Berrington’s Case, (1706) 91 Eng. Rep. 874 (K.B.), 3 Salk. 362; and Bond v. Spark, (1704) 
88 Eng. Rep. 1318 (K.B.), 12 Mod. 275). 
173. Id. at 498 (quoting Edie v. E. India Co., (1761) 96 Eng. Rep. 166, 167 (K.B.), 1 Black. W. 
295, 298). 
174. Id. But cf. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
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jury-trial right is that “issues of fact be submitted for determination” by the 
jury “with . . . instructions and guidance” provided by the court to “afford 
opportunity for that consideration by the jury which was secured by the rules 
governing trials at common law.”175 
The procedural revolution of the late 1930s sharpened these Seventh 
Amendment questions. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure collapsed 
equity and law into a single “civil action.”176 The merger of procedures for law 
and equity made Seventh Amendment questions all the more pertinent and 
vexing. In Galloway v. United States, for example, the Court considered a 
challenge to a federal judge’s ability to grant a directed verdict in a civil case.177 
Justice Rutledge rejected the argument that empowering the judge to enter 
judgment for the defendant based on an examination of the facts of the case 
had denied the plaintiff her Seventh Amendment rights. Observing that 
demurrers to the evidence and motions for new trials were sufficiently 
analogous to the directed verdict, he upheld the judgment.178 He added, “The 
[Seventh] Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural 
incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791, any more 
than it tied them to the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of 
evidence then prevailing.”179 
Hence, today, not every element of eighteenth-century common law is 
contained in the Seventh Amendment jury-trial right,180 any more than every 
element of eighteenth-century common law is contained in the Sixth 
Amendment jury-trial right.181 Only those 1791 practices that “preserve the 
basic institution of jury trial in . . . its most fundamental elements”182 are beyond 
                                                                                                                                                          
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The rule of law is about 
form.”). 
175. Gasoline Prods. Co., 283 U.S. at 498.  
176. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (amended 2007). 
177. 319 U.S. 372 (1943). 
178. Id. at 389-90. 
179. Id. at 390. 
180. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (stating that “constitutional history reveals no 
intention on the part of the Framers ‘to equate the constitutional and common-law 
characteristics of the jury’” and finding that six-member juries did not violate the right to 
trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment). 
181. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (finding that although the eighteenth-century 
Framers might have expected a twelve-man jury, “the [twelve]-man requirement cannot be 
regarded as an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment”).  
182. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 
(1987) (“Only those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the 
essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond the reach of the legislature.” 
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legislative or judicial manipulation. Conversely, only those innovations in 
procedure that cripple these fundamental functions of the jury are 
unconstitutional.  
 3. What About Conflicting or Indeterminate History? 
What does the Court do with conflicting or indeterminate history? What 
does the Seventh Amendment preserve when common law practice is unclear, 
or contradictory, or so fragmentary as to frustrate reconstruction?183  
The problem is acute. Even if one limits the historical inquiry to 1791, 
eighteenth-century English common law itself was in flux. Justice Brennan 
reiterated that “[t]he line between law and equity (and therefore between jury 
and non-jury trial) was not a fixed and static one.”184 There was “a continual 
process of borrowing by one jurisdiction from the other,” which eventually 
“led to a very large overlap between law and equity.”185 Professor James wrote 
that this division was a historical accident, as “[a]t no time in history was the 
line dividing equity from law altogether—or even largely—the product of a 
rational choice.”186 To the extent historical data from other centuries come into 
play, the potential for conflict increases. Modern procedures and forms of 
action unknown to the Framers only exacerbate the problem of obscure or 
indeterminate history. 
The Court has attempted to resolve conflicting or indeterminate Seventh 
Amendment history through a combination of analogical reasoning and policy 
considerations. In Ross v. Bernhard,187 for example, the Court employed a  
three-part framework to decide whether a claim triggered the Seventh 
Amendment. Within this framework, a court first considers “pre-merger 
custom,”188 meaning the custom as it existed in 1791. Second, the court 
considers “the remedy sought”;189 this, the Court has stated, is the more 
                                                                                                                                                          
(quoting Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 156 n.11)); Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 
596 (1897) (“So long as this substance of right is preserved the procedure by which this 
result shall be reached is wholly within the discretion of the legislature . . . .”). 
183. For variants on this theme, see MADISON, supra note 19, at 379.  
184. Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 577 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (quoting James, supra note 126, at 658). 
185. Id. (quoting James, supra note 126, at 658-59). 
186. James, supra note 126, at 661.  
187. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
188. Id. at 538 n.10. 
189. Id. 
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important factor.190 Third, the court considers “the practical abilities and 
limitations of juries.”191 
 First, a court attempts to find historical analogues. Sometimes, the 
analogue is apparent;192 sometimes, it is not.193 One difficulty with reasoning 
from historical analogy is a basic matter of judicial competence. As Justice 
Brennan lamented in Terry, to require judges “with neither the training nor 
time necessary for reputable historical scholarship, to root through the tangle 
of primary and secondary sources to determine [a suitable analogy] . . . 
embroil[s] courts in recondite controversies better left to legal historians.”194 
Even if a court had the competence and leisure to investigate this history, “the 
most exacting historical research may not elicit a clear historical analog.”195 
History may be schematic or fragmentary.196 In such a case, the most 
appropriate historical analogue simply appears to be the one that can garner 
five votes on the Supreme Court.197 
Additionally, there is the problem of the appropriate level of generality at 
which to look for an analogue. To determine whether a cause of action triggers 
a jury-trial right, is the question whether a twenty-first-century suit is more 
akin to an eighteenth-century suit to obtain money simpliciter (which looks 
like damages), or to obtain money wrongfully withheld (which looks like 
equitable restitution)?198 To determine whether a statutory procedural device 
violates the Seventh Amendment, is the question whether the judge had the 
ability to modify a jury verdict in 1791, or to modify a jury verdict to increase 
the award?199 The Court has not arrived at a consistent answer to these 
                                                                
190. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987). 
191. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.  
192. See id. at 533 (noting that “some proceedings were unmistakably actions at law triable to a 
jury” and listing as examples “actions for damages to a person or property, for libel and 
slander, for recovery of land, and for conversion of personal property”). 
193. See id. at 538 n.10 (regarding this part of the test as “the most difficult to apply”).  
194. Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 576 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
195. Id. at 577. 
196. See, e.g., Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 660 (1935) (noting 
“[f]ragmentary references” to a particular procedural practice at common law).  
197. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 565 (plurality opinion) (disagreeing with the concurrences on the 
proper eighteenth-century analogue). 
198. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (cautioning that not all demands for money 
are necessarily demands for “legal” relief). 
199. In Dimick, for instance, the Court acknowledged that judges had the ability to modify a jury 
verdict in exchange for an agreement not to hold a new trial. But the majority considered 
that analogue pitched at too high a level of abstraction. The issue was whether a court had 
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questions, although, as discussed below, the Court has sent some signals as to 
how to frame the appropriate level of generality. 
Where history is not dispositive or an analogy not apparent, the Court has 
used policy considerations to resolve these problems. But only rarely has it 
done so in an explicitly interest-balancing manner. The Court later200 
repudiated the fleeting footnote in Ross that counseled express consideration of 
“the practical abilities and limitations of juries,”201 although that admonition 
appears to have been partially resurrected.202 Instead of an open-ended 
balancing of jury rights on the one hand and government interests on the 
other, an unstated preference for erring on the side of jury trials appears to 
hover over the Seventh Amendment, at least where Congress has not spoken.203 
It serves as a type of judicial tiebreaker when historical questions of Seventh 
Amendment coverage are inconclusive. In hard cases, the Court’s approach, at 
least in the twentieth century, seems to “reflect[] . . . an unarticulated but 
apparently overpowering bias in favor of jury trials in civil actions.”204 
However, this bias is less prevalent in cases concerning jury form and 
function, rather than whether a jury is constitutionally required in the first 
instance. As discussed below, in practice, the Court’s receptivity to historical 
analogues acts in two, slightly contradictory ways: it expands the number of 
matters that trigger the civil-jury right far beyond those that existed in 1791, 
and simultaneously empowers rulemakers to restrain that jury to a far greater 
degree than they could in 1791. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
the ability to increase rather than reduce a jury award. At that level of specificity, the Court 
held that there was no nineteenth-century analogue. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
But see Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593 (1897) (concluding that, because the 
judge was empowered in 1791 to grant a new trial based on conflicting juror answers, the 
court was empowered not only to grant a new trial based on those conflicting answers, but 
also to overturn the general verdict and return judgment for the other side). 
200. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987); see also Redish, supra note 113, at 524 
(speculating that the Ross footnote may have adopted a “balancing” approach to Seventh 
Amendment claims). 
201. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). 
202. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). For more discussion 
of Markman, see infra Section II.B. 
203. Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article 
III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
407, 408 (1995) (noting that “the Court has been more than vigorous in its protection of the 
jury trial right in the absence of a congressional directive to the contrary,” but also observing 
the Court’s deference to Congress when the latter expressly limits jury-trial rights). 
204. Ross, 396 U.S. at 551 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
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 B. The Seventh Amendment Historical Test Restated: 
 Boundary Setting and Tailoring  
Despite its complications, the Seventh Amendment historical test endures. 
Further, the historical test performs functions that are familiar in scrutiny 
analysis: it defines the coverage of a constitutional provision and helps to 
gauge whether regulations that fall within that covered area are appropriately 
tailored. First, history serves as a familiar boundary-setting device. It guides 
judicial discretion as to which cases fall within the scope of the Seventh 
Amendment and which cases do not. Second, history serves a tailoring 
function. It dictates the extent to which legislatures or courts may alter both 
the form and the function of the jury that the Seventh Amendment guarantees. 
Procedural innovations that preserve the fundamentals of the jury-trial right are 
constitutional; procedural innovations that destroy the fundamentals are not. 
I do not want to minimize the criticisms surrounding the Seventh 
Amendment historical test. As Ellen Sward has written, “[T]he use of the word 
‘preserved’ and the reference to the common law [in the Seventh 
Amendment] invoke[] history, but the precise role of history has been the 
subject of considerable controversy and inconsistency over the last two 
centuries.”205 Some writers argue that the historical test itself is not required by 
the Amendment: the test is nothing more than a tottering doctrinal structure 
built upon a faulty interpretive premise.206 Others agree that the historical test 
is required, but that its current formulation is so baroque as to be nearly 
useless.207 
These are powerful criticisms, but they tend to discount the Seventh 
Amendment historical test’s value as a remarkably complete instance of 
history-centered constitutional implementation. For, despite its detractors, the 
Seventh Amendment historical test represents one of the few areas in which a 
constitutional decision rule based on history and common law has been most 
fully realized.208 In fact, the historical test represents a rare instance in which 
the modern Court has come to almost complete agreement on methodology, if 
                                                                
205. Sward, supra note 117, at 573.  
206. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 110, at 1021-22 (stating that Justice Story misread the Seventh 
Amendment in Wonson and that the mistake has been compounded ever since).  
207. See Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 576-78 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (urging a more simplified historical approach); see 
also Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 114, at 448-49. 
208. Meyler, supra note 19, at 596 (noting the value of Seventh Amendment doctrine to 
methodologies that try to integrate history and common law). 
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not actual outcomes.209 As such, the Seventh Amendment test may serve as a 
model from which to construct a durable but flexible Second Amendment test 
reliant on text, history, tradition, and the common law. 
This Section discusses how the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence 
performs these scope and tailoring functions, and how it represents a fragile 
agreement among all members of the Court on how to craft a doctrinal test 
from history. Part III will then discuss how these lessons could apply to the 
Second Amendment. 
The Court issued what amounts to a restatement of the historical test in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.210 and City of Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.211 Markman concerned whether the claim-construction 
portion of a patent infringement suit—the portion dealing with the scope of 
the patentee’s rights—required a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.212 In 
Markman, a unanimous Supreme Court endorsed a two-part historical test. 
First, a court must decide whether it is “dealing with a cause of action that 
either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one 
that was.”213 If the action falls within Seventh Amendment protection, the court 
must then ask “whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in 
order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 
1791.”214 
The first part of Markman performs what may be described as the scope- or 
boundary-setting function. The Markman Court had little difficulty with the 
first part of the test. The infringement suit did not present a “conflict between 
actual English common-law practice and American assumptions about [that 
practice], or between English and American practices at the relevant time.”215 
The correct application of historical boundaries was undisputed. 
“[C]ompar[ing] the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the 
courts of England” led to a clear conclusion that infringement actions are jury 
actions.216 
                                                                
209. See id. (noting the agreement on methodology across a wide range of ideological opinions 
on the Court). 
210. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
211. 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
212. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372. 
213. Id. at 376. 
214. Id.; see also Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 708 (restating Markman as “[c]onsistent with the 
textual mandate [of the Seventh Amendment]”). 
215. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 n.3. 
216. Id. at 377 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989)). 
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However, the conclusion that infringement actions are jury actions did not 
mean that every question in the infringement suit went to the jury. Admitting 
that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed a jury-trial right did not answer the 
question whether the particular issue of claim construction had to be tried to a 
jury.217 In other words, the fact that the Constitution requires a jury says little 
about what the jury must hear or, more broadly, what form the jury must take. 
In addressing what the jury must hear, the Court adopted what may be 
described as the tailoring portion of the historical test, that is, “whether the 
particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance 
of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.”218 Essentially, the Court asked 
whether allowing judges to construe claims actually deprived litigants of the 
jury right that the Seventh Amendment guarantees. According to the Markman 
Court, the Seventh Amendment text preserves only “those incidents which are 
regarded as fundamental”—in particular, those incidents “inherent in and of 
the essence of the system of trial by jury.”219 
What are those fundamental incidents? Elsewhere, the Court has stated the 
purpose of any jury-trial right in criminal and civil cases is to provide “fair and 
equitable resolution of factual issues” and to “prevent government 
oppression.”220 It does not require, in the words of commentators, a 
“photographic reproduction of historical procedures.”221 So, for instance, a jury 
reduced from twelve to six members does not impair the fundamental role of 
the jury, even though the English common law tradition was to empanel 
twelve jurors.222 Nor are procedural innovations such as the directed verdict, 
the limited remand for retrial, summary judgment, and judgment on special 
answers considered so disruptive as to impair the jury in its most fundamental 
elements.223 
                                                                
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 376. 
219. Id. at 377 (citation omitted). 
220. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (citation omitted). 
221. Redish & La Fave, supra note 203, at 415. 
222. See Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 160. 
223. Conversely, unanimity of the jury verdict was a feature of the common law civil jury that is 
part of the Seventh Amendment. In American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 
(1897), the Court called unanimity “one of the peculiar and essential features of trial by jury 
at the common law.” The matter was so obvious to the Court that “[n]o authorities are 
needed to sustain this proposition.” Id. Strangely enough, unanimity is not so fundamental 
as to be applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause in criminal cases. See 
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1972) (finding that unanimity is not required in 
state criminal proceedings); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359-60 (1972) (holding 
that the Due Process Clause does not require unanimity in state criminal trials); see also 
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The Markman Court conceded that “[t]he ‘substance of the common-law 
right’ is . . . a pretty blunt instrument for drawing distinctions.”224 While some 
tailoring questions will be historically clear, courts will often be “forced to 
make a judgment . . . without the benefit of any foolproof test.”225 In the 
absence of unequivocal historical practice, a court decides whether a process 
preserves the Seventh Amendment in its fundamentals by (1) “seeking the  
best analogy . . . between an old [practice] and the new”;226 failing that, by 
reference to (2) “existing precedent”;227 and, failing that, as a last resort, to  
(3) “functional considerations” of the respective capacities of judges or juries.228 
Using these tests, the unanimous Markman Court ultimately found that the 
judge and not the jury should perform the claim construction portion of an 
infringement suit. First, the Court found no consistent practice in England 
during the relevant time period that put the matter of claim construction, or 
any analogous practice, in the hands of the jury.229 Second, the limited 
precedent on point tended to reflect the view that analogues to claim 
constructions were legal issues for a judge to decide.230 Third, the Court 
concluded that the issue of claim construction was better suited to the judge’s 
role as expositor of the law, rather than the jury’s role as a finder of fact.231 
Finally, allocating this function to the judge advanced the general policy of 
uniformity in patent litigation.232 
In Del Monte Dunes, the Court reaffirmed Markman’s method of 
implementing the Seventh Amendment through a historical test.233 But the 
Court fractured as to its application. Del Monte Dunes addressed whether 
certain liability and compensation issues in an inverse condemnation 
proceeding brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require a jury trial.234 Every 
                                                                                                                                                          
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.14 (2010) (discussing Apodaca and 
Johnson). 
224. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996).  
225. Id. at 377.  
226. Id. at 378 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1987)).  
227. Id. at 384. 
228. Id. at 388. 
229. Id. at 379-81, 384. 
230. Id. at 384-88. 
231. Id. at 388-89. 
232. Id. at 390-91. 
233. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999). 
234. An “inverse condemnation” proceeding is “a cause of action against a governmental 
defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental 
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been 
  
text, history, and tradition 
891 
 
member of the Court agreed that the historical test applies to the Seventh 
Amendment. Every member of the Court agreed that the first question is 
whether the cause of action was tried at law at the Founding or analogous to 
such a cause of action.235 And every member of the Court also agreed that, if a 
jury is required, the next part of the test uses “history to determine whether the 
particular issues, or analogous ones, were decided by judge or by jury . . . at the 
time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.”236 Finally, “[w]here history does 
not provide a clear answer, [the Court] look[s] to precedent and functional 
considerations.”237 
Only a plurality, however, concluded that a jury was required. The 
threshold point of disagreement was whether a § 1983 inverse condemnation 
proceeding was more like a tort suit, which requires a jury, or more like an 
eminent domain proceeding, which does not. In Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion, this specific type of § 1983 inverse condemnation proceeding was 
sufficiently analogous to a tort suit to fall within the boundaries of the Seventh 
Amendment.238 As to the second part of the historical test—whether the factual 
issues raised by the proceeding must go to a jury to preserve the right in its 
fundamentals—the plurality admitted that there was neither a clear historical 
analogue nor direct precedent. But it held that the traditional factfinding 
function of the jury justified a jury trial in this case.239 
Justice Scalia believed that the appropriate level of analogy was a common 
law action similar to a § 1983 suit simpliciter, not a § 1983 suit for inverse 
condemnation, as argued by Kennedy’s plurality decision,240 and not “some 
generic . . . Fifth Amendment taking” as advanced by the dissent.241 Justice 
Souter, too, found the plurality’s reasoning wanting. The most logical 
analogue for an inverse condemnation proceeding was the same as that for an 
ordinary condemnation proceeding: eminent domain.242 Because there was no 
                                                                                                                                                          
attempted by the taking agency.” United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (quoting 
DONALD G. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328 (1971)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
235. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 708. 
236. Id. at 718. 
237. Id.; see also id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(agreeing that “history is our guide” with respect to both portions of the test and in 
adopting the Markman formulation); id. at 733 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (agreeing with the Markman formulation of the Seventh Amendment test).  
238. Id. at 711-15 (plurality opinion). 
239. Id. at 719-22 (plurality opinion).  
240. Id. at 710-13 (plurality opinion). 
241. Id. at 724 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
242. Id. at 736-40 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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right to a jury in an eminent domain proceeding in 1791, the fact that the suit 
was presented as a § 1983 tort claim was irrelevant. Condemnation proceedings 
“carried ‘no uniform and established right to a common law jury trial’” at 
English common law in 1791.243 In Justice Souter’s view, the Seventh 
Amendment “preserve[s]” the common law right but “does not create a right 
where none existed.”244 
Together, Markman and Del Monte Dunes restate the historical approach to 
Seventh Amendment questions. First, as to the question of Seventh 
Amendment coverage, the issue is whether the party claiming the right can 
establish a clear historical source or analogue for the right to a trial by jury. A 
court must search for an analogue at the appropriate level of generality. If 
history shows that the analogue does not display a “uniform and established 
right,” or if it shows that there was, in fact, no jury right, that is normally the 
end of the inquiry. Second, even if the Seventh Amendment is implicated 
because an analogue exists, the court must address whether the challenged 
procedure has violated the Seventh Amendment right in its fundamentals. In 
this portion of the test, the court first looks to history to examine whether there 
are analogues to the type of procedural innovation at issue in the case. If not, 
the court looks to precedent. If precedent is unclear, the court may resolve the 
matter based upon “functional considerations” so long as none of those factors 
impairs the function of the jury in its fundamentals. What are those 
fundamentals? The fundamentals of the jury are to act as a factfinder and to 
serve as a buffer against government oppression.245 Rulemakers have a fairly 
free hand in creating new procedures, as long as they retain these essential jury 
functions. 
Markman and Del Monte Dunes are also important as a matter of 
constitutional theory. In some respects, these two cases represent a détente of 
sorts between the originalist and non-originalist wings of the Court.246 For 
                                                                
243. Id. at 738 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 5 JAMES WILLIAM 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 38.82[1], at 38-268 (2d ed. 1996)). 
244. Id. 
245. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (identifying these two purposes of the jury 
right); see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“A right to jury trial is granted to 
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.”); Colleen P. 
Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 723, 751 (1993) (“The value of a jury buffer in civil cases was demonstrated by the 
English experience, where juries had awarded substantial damages against officials who had 
committed unreasonable searches and seizures.”).  
246. Meyler, supra note 19, at 596 (observing that Seventh Amendment doctrine is valuable in 
analyzing how and when to incorporate the common law in interpreting the Constitution 
“precisely because Justices from Brennan and Marshall to Kennedy and Scalia generally 
concur that, in the Seventh Amendment context . . . history is relevant to constitutional 
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years, originalists and non-originalists have struggled over how much 
discretion is to be left to judges in construing the Constitution. In the last 
decade or so, the battle has become internecine among originalists 
themselves.247 In each case, the fundamental question has been how much 
judges should allow constitutional norms to be constrained by the history that 
surrounds that text.248 
Markman and Del Monte Dunes establish that it is possible to have every 
member of the Court—right, left, and center—subscribe to the following 
propositions: (1) history should drive constitutional interpretation; (2) history 
frequently does not itself provide sufficient guidance for constitutional 
implementation; and (3) some reference point outside the text, but not hostile 
to it, is required to successfully translate a piece of eighteenth-century script 
into a workable legal norm. The fact that the Court has reached some level of 
methodological agreement over the relatively sleepy issue of the right to a civil 
jury offers hope, however faint, that something similar may be possible with 
the far more charged issue of the right to keep and bear arms.  
i i i .  a second amendment historical test:  the seventh 
amendment’s (partial)  answer to heller ’s  riddle 
With its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has drafted a 
schematic, if not quite a blueprint, for how to construct a historical test. This 
schematic shows that a historical test can address some familiar problems of 
constitutional implementation, problems that have been resolved by other 
doctrinal tests in other areas. In particular, the Seventh Amendment historical 
test provides a structure for deciding (1) which activities or prohibitions fall 
within the scope of the constitutional guarantee; (2) which activities or 
prohibitions transgress that constitutional guarantee; and (3) what kinds of 
proof or arguments may be deployed in evaluating both (1) and (2). 
Furthermore, it does so in a way that minimizes (though it can never 
completely eliminate) recourse to judicial evaluations of government interests, 
including those that appear in the traditional tiers-of-scrutiny formulation. 
Applying a history-centered methodology shaped by the Seventh 
Amendment, however, requires an additional layer of justification. The 
Seventh Amendment uses the terms “preserve” and “common law”; the Second 
                                                                                                                                                          
adjudication”). 
247. See supra notes 20-23 for literature on divisions amongst originalists.  
248. For a more thorough discussion of the ways in which originalism has migrated from 
“original intent” to “original meaning” to “objective original public understanding,” as well 
as the concessions that migration has required, see Colby, supra note 23, at 713-44.  
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Amendment does not. Critics of this Article will say that I expect a doctrinal tail 
to wag a textual dog; they will insist that doctrine should sprout organically 
from the constitutional provision itself, rather than be transplanted from some 
far-off corner of the Bill of Rights. While that criticism may ring true for those 
who subscribe to a clause-bound approach to constitutional interpretation, as I 
explain below, more holistic methodologies support the approach discussed 
here.249 Borrowing is a common feature of constitutional construction, as 
Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai have recently explored.250 As these authors note, 
judges borrow a range of material, including text, frameworks, doctrine, 
rationales, and principles, from both within and without the Constitution.251 
Borrowing can be driven by the text, context, and history of a particular 
constitutional provision,252 by prudential concerns about stability and 
predictability in the law,253 by the incremental nature of common law reasoning 
itself,254 and often by all three.255 
This Part aims to justify why anyone should borrow from the Seventh 
Amendment to resolve problems with the Second. I reiterate, however, that the 
                                                                
249. A working definition of holistic legal reasoning is that methodology which assumes that a 
provision of constitutional text should be interpreted in light of other portions of the text 
and in light of the structure, purpose, and values of the Constitution as a whole. For some 
definitions, see Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our 
Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1267 (2001), which argues for a “holistic form 
of constitutional interpretation in which parts of the Constitution adopted at different time 
periods are read together to create a principle with respect to the former parts that differs 
from the reading those parts previously had”; and Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 940 (2003), which defines 
“constitutional holism” as “a commitment to attempting, if fairly possible, to read the 
Constitution . . . [including its underlying principles] as a coherent, integrated whole.” See 
also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 795-802 (1999) (discussing the 
benefits and risks of holistic constitutional interpretation). But see Adrian Vermeule & 
Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 730 (2000) (challenging holistic legal reasoning). 
250. See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18. 
251. See id. at 467. 
252. For example, the Seventh Amendment speaks of preserving the right to trial by jury, which 
points to some repository of law outside the Constitution itself. Both Article IV and the 
Fourteenth Amendment use the terms “privileges” and “immunities.” See U.S. CONST. art. 
IV; id. amend. XIV. The Court in Heller looked to see how “people” was used elsewhere in 
the Constitution to determine how it should be interpreted in the Second Amendment. See 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-81 (2008). For more on holistic readings of 
the Constitution, see supra note 249. 
253. See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 521 (identifying these advantages to borrowing).  
254. See id. at 516-17 (discussing borrowing and judicial minimalism). 
255. Cf. id. at 511-22 (discussing borrowing’s applicability to various forms of constitutional 
theory). 
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necessity of borrowing a historical test—indeed the need to adopt any historical 
test, borrowed or not—flows from some contestable postulates: First, that the 
Court’s rhetorical commitments in Heller and McDonald reflect genuine 
methodological convictions, as opposed to transient judicial politics; second, 
that the Court expects the lower courts to produce and apply a test that satisfies 
these rhetorical commitments; and third, that the various flavors of scrutiny 
(intermediate, intermediate-intermediate, strict, semi-strict, rational basis with 
bite, etc.) are unpalatable to the majorities that decided both Heller and 
McDonald.256 
 The postulates having been restated, Section III.A briefly summarizes the 
reasons for borrowing and explains why the Seventh Amendment historical 
test is suitable for borrowing. Section III.B will demonstrate how the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms raises the same questions about the 
use of history that have challenged the Court in Seventh Amendment cases. In 
particular, Section III.B will showcase how the Court’s Heller and McDonald 
decisions raise familiar questions of whose history counts for Second 
Amendment construction, how much history counts, and what a court must  
do about conflicting and indeterminate history. Section III.C will then  
explain how a Second Amendment historical test, patterned from the  
Seventh, can supply the familiar boundary-setting and tailoring functions  
normally provided by tiers-of-scrutiny or mixed-category-and-tiers-of-scrutiny 
approaches. Section III.C ends by demonstrating how a historical test for the 
Second Amendment might operate in practice. 
A. Borrowing from the Seventh Amendment for the Second:  
A Justification in Four Parts  
 Courts often borrow from other areas of constitutional law to interpret text 
and to create decision rules.257 Justice Scalia borrowed liberally from First 
Amendment doctrine in Heller to support the personal and preconstitutional 
nature of the Second Amendment and to urge a categorical approach to its 
limitations.258 But once we move beyond the proposition that the Second 
Amendment, like the First, contemplates categories, we are set adrift. The 
                                                                
256. The more exotic the label, the more it appears to create a “de facto if not official intermediate 
scrutiny.” Sullivan, supra note 66, at 299. For a list of the various approaches, see Rosenthal 
& Malcolm, supra note 12, at 439 n.12; and sources cited supra note 57.  
257. See generally Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 460-84 (describing how judges and litigants 
appropriate legal materials associated with other areas of the law). For more on the concept 
of decision rules, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2004). 
258. See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 473-74.  
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flexible levels-of-scrutiny analysis that encumbers the First Amendment is 
“baggage”259 the Heller majority seems eager to shed when it comes to the 
Second Amendment.260 The question, then, is what sources courts may use to 
implement the Second Amendment once we accept the notion that it is to be 
implemented primarily through categories rather than balancing. The Seventh 
Amendment historical test provides some guidance. 
First, the Seventh Amendment offers intratextual clues as to what it means 
to “not infringe” or to “preserve” rights when those rights are understood to 
come from some prior, extratextual source. Second, even if one rejected the 
usefulness of understanding the word “infringe” by reference to the word 
“preserve,” the Court insists that the Second Amendment simply reflects a 
preconstitutional right whose scope is determined by extratextual historical 
sources. It makes sense, then, for the Court to borrow doctrine that it has used 
to implement another right that shares the same features. Third, Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence, for the most part, rejects balancing tests and forces 
the Court to depend primarily on analogical reasoning from history and 
common law in order to determine its applicability and scope. As such, the 
Court’s implementation of the Seventh Amendment through analogical 
reasoning supplies a set of framing devices that may be transplanted to the 
Second Amendment. Finally, borrowing from the Seventh Amendment to 
develop a historical test is apolitical, in the sense that a historical test does not 
lead to predetermined outcomes. Borrowing could reinforce the argument that 
history-centered doctrinal tests are largely neutral and trans-substantive, rather 
than rationalizations for conservative policy preferences.261 
1. The Textual Necessity for Second Amendment Construction and 
 Holistic Justifications for Borrowing from the Seventh Amendment  
The Second Amendment does not mean what it says.262 We know this 
because applying the strict lexical meaning of the Second Amendment words 
                                                                
259. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 
07-290) (question of Roberts, C.J.); see also Lund, supra note 42 (manuscript at 1-3). 
260. See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 474, 513 (noting that Heller borrowed a First Amendment 
category-and-exception approach, but declined to borrow balancing approaches). A 
rejection of balancing would also seem to encompass rejection of the time, place, and 
manner restrictions that the First Amendment has developed. See Sullivan, supra note 66, at 
297 (describing the evaluation of time, place, and manner regulations as a type of 
intermediate scrutiny). 
261. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 5-6.  
262. This is contrary to what Senator James McClure and Michael Barone may believe. See 132 
CONG. REC. 9,603 (1986) (statement of Sen. McClure); Michael Barone, The Supreme Court 
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“keep,” “bear,” and “arm” would be cataclysmic. “Keep” means “have.”263 
“Bear” means “carry.”264 “Arm” means “weapon.”265 A man strolling along 
Pennsylvania Avenue with a tactical nuclear warhead under his arm satisfies 
the dictionary sense of all these words.266 
Constitutional construction267 is necessary when the meaning of the text 
“runs out.”268 With the Second Amendment, however, the problem is not that 
the text has run out;269 it is that a literal reading of the text leads to absurd 
results.270 Consequently, these quotidian terms, “keep,” “bear,” “arm,” are 
bracketed by two other terms: “right” and “infringed.” These two words 
                                                                                                                                                          
Rules that the Second Amendment Means What It Says, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June  
27, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/barone/2008/06/27/the-supreme-court-rules 
-that-the-second-amendment-means-what-it-says. 
263. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (“[T]he most natural reading of 
‘keep Arms’ in the Second Amendment is to ‘have weapons.’”). 
264. Id. at 584 (“At the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to ‘carry.’”) (citing various 
Founding-era dictionaries). 
265. Id. at 581. 
266. This normatively unacceptable level of risk also challenges champions of what has been 
described as “semantic originalism,” in which the meaning of constitutional text is “stated at 
the level of generality found in the text.” Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 
IND. L.J. 1183, 1210 (2012). See generally Richard A. Allen, What Arms? A Textualist’s View of 
the Second Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. J. 191 (2008) (discussing the textual 
challenges of construing the Second Amendment). 
267. Modern originalist theory recognizes a distinction between constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional construction. Constitutional construction recognizes that interpreting the 
historical meaning of a constitutional phrase may not be sufficient to produce a workable 
rule of law, and that judges may have to fashion a workable doctrine “consistent with . . . 
original meaning but not deducible from it.” See Colby, supra note 23, at 731-33 (quoting 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
121 (2004)). Heller exemplifies this turn. See Solum, supra note 20, at 975-80. 
268. Colby, supra note 23, at 733 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
269. The word “bear,” meaning “carry,” is not ambiguous or vague, unlike the word “equality” 
or “due.” If you asked an eighteenth-century time traveler to bear a letter for you, he would 
know exactly what you meant. 
270. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) (“[T]hough the common-law pedigree of 
Tennessee’s rule [permitting deadly force against any fleeing felon] is pure on its face, 
changes in the legal and technological context mean the rule is distorted almost beyond 
recognition when literally applied.”); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617-18 (1972) 
(rejecting a “literalistic” approach to the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 
1, in favor of a purposivist approach). As Professor Eskridge points out, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion effectively rewrites the text to read: “The right of law-abiding people to keep Arms 
in their homes, for self-defense purposes, shall not be subjected to unreasonable regulation.” 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 209 (2009). This reading of the 
text may be plausible in light of tradition, but it is not a plain reading. See id. 
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transform plain meaning into idiomatic meaning.271 And idiomatic meanings 
require construction. 
Holistic legal reasoning from the Seventh Amendment provides some clues 
as to how to construe this phrase. Reading the constitutional text as a whole 
allows interpretations of one section of text to shed light on the meaning of 
others.272 The Court’s Heller and McDonald opinions are saturated with such 
“intratextual” reasoning.273 As just one example, Justice Scalia observed that the 
right of the “people” to assemble and the right of the “people” to keep and bear 
arms must be interpreted identically to allow for individual rather than solely 
collective rights.274 Although the Seventh Amendment uses the terms 
“preserved” and “common law,” which do not appear in the Second 
Amendment,275 the textual implications can be overdrawn. As a matter of 
holistic legal reasoning, the Court’s construction of the term “preserved” can 
help us understand how it could construe the word “infringed” in the Second 
Amendment. 
The Heller Court said that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the 
scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them.”276 
Whatever the truth of this assertion with respect to other constitutional rights, 
this language signals that the Heller majority understands the scope of the right 
to keep and bear arms to be fixed at some definitive period of adoption, and 
that fixation insulates it from legislative, executive, or judicial alteration.277 
Moreover, the scope of the right does not appear on the face of the text itself: 
                                                                
271. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-600 (discussing idiomatic use of common terminology in the 
Second Amendment). 
272. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 249, at 940. Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert have 
argued, for instance, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause extends to 
sex-based discrimination when read in light of the Nineteenth Amendment’s extension of 
voting rights to women. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex 
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
273. For an assessment of holistic legal reasoning applied to the Second Amendment, see Akhil 
Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145 (2008) 
(discussing the use of holistic legal reasoning in both the majority opinion and the dissent in 
Heller). See generally Amar, supra note 249 (discussing the benefits and risks of holistic 
constitutional interpretation). 
274. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 579-81. 
275. Cf. Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, 
Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 84 (2009) 
(“[T]he Second Amendment’s text does not ‘preserve’ a preexisting right or regulatory 
scheme, but rather contemplates more generally that the militia be ‘well-regulated.’”). 
276. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35. 
277. See id. at 635 (explaining that the Second Amendment is “the very product of an interest 
balancing by the people” at the time of its adoption). 
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arm, bear, and keep have the same meanings now as they did in 1791, but 
“longstanding” regulations are “presumptively” constitutional.278 The sources 
used to define the scope of the right, and the nature of an infringement, must 
be extratextual and roughly contemporaneous with the relevant dates of 
ratification or, as I will discuss below, incorporation. 
This is where the idea of “preservation” in the Seventh Amendment helps. 
What does it mean to “infringe” a “right,” given that both the right and its 
scope are fixed by some extraconstitutional sources in the past? “Infringe,” 
according to eighteenth-century lexicographers, means “to violate; to break 
laws or contracts” or “to destroy; to hinder.”279 By comparison, the civil jury 
right must be “preserved.” “Preserve,” as defined in the eighteenth century, 
means “[t]o save, to defend from destruction or any evil, to keep.”280 
 Taking these sources at face value and examining them intratextually, 
“preserve[]”281 connotes restraints on government activity at least equivalent to 
those implied by “not infringe[].”282 That is, as a matter of raw text, 
government regulations that result in departures from the jury-trial right as 
understood by Englishmen in 1791 are an infringement because they cannot be 
said to preserve, save, or keep the right as it existed in 1791.283 And, at least 
according to classical logic, if all infringements are failures to preserve, then if 
something has been preserved, it has not been infringed.284 
                                                                
278.  See id. at 626-27 & n.26. 
279. JOHNSON, supra note 112; see also 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, Edward & Charles Dilly in the Poultry 1775) (defining 
“infringed” as “[v]iolated, broken, destroyed”); 1 SHERIDAN, supra note 112 (defining 
“infringe” as “to violate, to break laws or contracts; to destroy, to hinder”). Evidence of 
eighteenth-century usage suggests it was sometimes used as an absolute, connoting a 
binary. So, for example, in the case of Harwood v. Goodright, the litigants spoke of the 
“infringe[ment]” of a testament, by which they meant its “revocation.” 98 E.R. 981, 982 
(1774); see also Atkinson v. Baker, 100 E.R. 989, 990 (1791) (stating that the court “must 
take care not to infringe one of [the] first rules” of estate law). But all usages of the term do 
not convey this sense. See Jones v. Kitchen, 126 E.R. 787, 790 (1797) (discussing “rules of 
pleading, which if we infringe here, we may destroy altogether”). 
280. 1 JOHNSON, supra note 112; 1 SHERIDAN, supra note 112; see also PERRY, supra note 112, at 408 
(defining preserve as “to save, defend”). 
281. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
282. Id. amend. II. 
283. This is a position taken by some states, to the extent that they forbid the application of a 
jury-trial right to any action that did not exist prior to the adoption of that state’s 
constitution. See supra note 113 (citing the Ohio and Georgia state constitutional rights to a 
jury). 
284. As Professor Ernest Young pointed out, one could also argue that the most reasonable 
source for borrowing definitions is the First Amendment, which uses the term “abridging.” 
E-mail from Ernest A. Young, Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke University School of 
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 But the Court has had little trouble dispensing with ancient forms of 
common law practice,285 expanding coverage of the right to novel types of 
actions,286 or condoning numerous procedural innovations287 when construing 
the Seventh Amendment’s text. And yet, despite these departures, the Court 
maintains that the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury has been 
“preserved.” It is possible that this method of implementing the Seventh 
Amendment is wrong.288 But let us assume that the requirement to “preserve” 
the jury-trial right permits some latitude for common law development and 
legislative innovation, so long as the fundamentals are kept intact. A fortiori, 
then, modern deviations from eighteenth-century practice in the Second 
Amendment context cannot be said to “infringe” upon the right, if such 
modern deviations from eighteenth-century practice in the Seventh 
Amendment context “preserve” that right. If preserving the fundamentals of 
the jury-trial right is all that is required to remain faithful to the Seventh 
Amendment constitutional text, then any regulation that does not affect the 
fundamentals of the right to keep and bear arms cannot be said to infringe 
upon the Second.289 Thus, by examining dictionary definitions of a key term, 
                                                                                                                                                          
Law, to Darrell A.H. Miller, Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law 
(Mar. 20, 2012) (on file with author); see U.S. CONST. amend. I. While this is undoubtedly 
appealing, there are two responses. First, “abridge,” as defined by Samuel Johnson, not only 
means “to deprive” but also means “[t]o contract, to diminish, to cut short.” 1 JOHNSON, 
supra note 112. This latter meaning suggests that a regulation may run afoul of the First 
Amendment even if the regulation falls short of the complete violation, break, or destruction 
connoted by the term “infringe.” See id. Second, the Court has used various levels of 
scrutiny analysis, including overbreadth, to implement this concept of “abridge,” in the 
sense of diminution or contraction of the right. This is a mode of implementation the Court 
seems reluctant to apply in Second Amendment cases. So, from a purely descriptive and 
predictive point of view, such reluctance limits the usefulness of the intratextual links 
between “abridge[]” and “infringe[].” 
285. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931) (permitting a court to set 
aside a verdict in part, despite the common law tradition of setting aside the entire verdict). 
286. See Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (plurality opinion) (extending 
the jury-trial right to a union fair representation suit). 
287. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) (permitting a directed verdict despite 
there being no exact equivalent in common law procedure). 
288. Thomas, supra note 21, at 139-60 (arguing that the procedural innovation of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56 violates the Seventh Amendment). It is equally possible that the Court’s 
prior Seventh Amendment decisions are a type of “super precedent” that requires an 
unusual amount of effort to overturn. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 1204, 1205-06 (2006) (describing super precedents as those constitutional decisions so 
embedded in American institutions and norms that they are effectively insulated from 
reconsideration).  
289. One objection, of course, is that the Court has set the bar far too low for preserving the 
Seventh Amendment right, and that the Court needs to protect Seventh Amendment rights 
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“preserved” in the Seventh Amendment, and recognizing how that term has 
been construed through time, we get a better sense of what the term 
“infringed” may mean in the Second Amendment. 
2. Constitutional Construction and the Second and Seventh  
Amendments as Preconstitutional, Preexisting Rights 
Skeptics of holistic legal reasoning may argue that interpreting “infringe” 
in light of “preserve” is “too clever by half.”290 The Seventh Amendment 
textual command to “preserve” drives the historical test, not the other way 
around. But even skeptics must admit that a majority of the Court has 
apparently dedicated itself to a construction of the Second Amendment that 
replicates methodologically the focus on history that the Seventh Amendment 
demands textually. 
 First, as I have stated previously, not one member of the Court has 
suggested the meaning of the words “keep,” “bear,” or “arm” is exhausted by 
consulting Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary. Some construction is required. The Court 
has stated more than once that the right to keep and bear arms is, in some yet 
undefined sense, a product of preconstitutional history, rather than an 
eighteenth-century textual invention.291 The clues, according to the Court, are 
in the text itself: “The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly 
recognizes the pre-existence of the right [to keep and bear arms] and declares 
only that it ‘shall not be infringed.’”292 Therefore, according to the Court, the 
Second Amendment does not create the right to keep and bear arms; it merely 
                                                                                                                                                          
far more vigorously. This Article takes no position on that point, but assumes the legitimacy 
of the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. 
290. See Amar, supra note 249, at 799 (“Carried to extremes, intratextualism may lead to readings 
that are too clever by half—cabalistic overreadings conjuring up patterns that were not 
specifically intended and that are upon deep reflection not truly sound but merely 
cute . . . or mystical.”). For a similar caution, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand 
of the Past: History and Constitutional Justice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1617 (1997), which 
describes the “[a]esthetic [f]allacy” of constitutional interpretation as a supposition “that 
the Constitution is like a poem, a symphony, or a great work of political philosophy. Each 
word and every phrase must come together to form a harmonious and pleasing 
composition.” 
291. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (“[I]t has always been widely 
understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a 
pre-existing right.”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (“This is not a 
right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that 
instrument for its existence.”); see also infra Subsection III.B.1 for a fuller discussion of the 
implications of this pre-textual right. 
292. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.  
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recognizes, through the word “infringe,” a right that the Framers believed they 
possessed as free Englishmen.293 
The Court has construed the Seventh Amendment in much the same way. 
One of the defenses of borrowing is the notion that it “foster[s] a sense of 
fairness . . . a perception that comparable cases are being treated comparably, 
even though they may fall into different doctrinal categories.”294 As the Court 
has said, the Seventh Amendment does not create a trial by jury at common 
law, but simply acknowledges a preexisting right of Englishmen.295 Therefore, 
even putting aside holistic legal reasoning, since the Court indicates that both 
Amendments share the same features—both are considered preconstitutional, 
and the scope of each is determined in large part by common law history—an 
investigation into the Seventh Amendment’s implementation through a 
historical test can be illuminating. 
Furthermore, in areas of constitutional law far more open-textured than the 
Second Amendment, the Court has appealed to history to give the text 
meaning. For example, the Court’s originalists consider the rights the Fourth 
Amendment protects to be preconstitutional.296 Hence, in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, Justice Scalia looks to common law practice in 1791 to determine 
when a “search” or “seizure” is “unreasonable.”297 Justice Scalia recently 
observed that a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment must at the 
very least mean a physical invasion that would have constituted a trespass in 
1791.298 Similarly, originalists have looked to 1791 practice to determine what is 
meant by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel” or “unusual” 
                                                                
293. Id. at 593. 
294. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 485. 
295. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 738 (1999) 
(characterizing the “trial decision” as “preserv[ing] the substance of the common law right 
as it existed in 1791”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) 
(affirming that the right is that “which existed under English common law when the 
Amendment was adopted”); Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) 
(“The right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English 
common law when the Amendment was adopted.”); see also Township of Haddon v. Royal 
Ins. Co. of Am., 929 F. Supp. 774, 777 (D. N.J. 1996) (“[T]he Seventh Amendment merely 
preserved preexisting rights . . . .”). 
296. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (citing the Fourth Amendment as an example of a “pre-existing” 
right). 
297. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (“In determining whether a 
search or seizure is unreasonable, we begin with history. We look to the statutes and 
common law of the founding era to determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was 
meant to preserve.”). See generally Sklansky, supra note 22 (discussing and criticizing the 
historical approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
298. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
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punishment.299 And the Court has construed the Eleventh Amendment to 
acknowledge a common law tradition of sovereign immunity that the text itself 
does not disclose.300 
The Court’s process of borrowing doctrine from other areas of 
constitutional law is well documented. Given that the Second Amendment is 
still largely unknown territory, the Court may wish to seize the opportunity to 
select vehicles that have not been “spoilt” by non-originalist precedent,301 or 
that are laden with less “baggage.”302 Using lessons from the Seventh 
Amendment’s analytical framework to answer Second Amendment questions 
fits within the Court’s current project of constitutional construction grounded 
in historical methods. 
3. History, Common Law, and Reasoning by Analogy in  
Constitutional Construction  
The Seventh Amendment has forced the Court to address second-order 
questions about the use of analogical reasoning itself. Of course, analogical 
reasoning is not unique to the Seventh Amendment. What is unique is that the 
Seventh Amendment’s text drives the Court to look for historical analogues in 
a fashion that it can avoid when construing other constitutional provisions.303 
The Amendment says “preserve” and “rules of the common law,” and the 
Court must remain faithful to the literal meaning of those terms. But it cannot 
                                                                
299. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 960-96 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(conducting a historical analysis to determine whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
disproportionate punishment). 
300. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727 (1999) (recognizing that the common law tradition of 
sovereign immunity is part of the Eleventh Amendment, even though the concept “fall[s] 
outside the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much 
for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.” (citing Blatchford v. 
Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991))). 
301. I take no position on the wisdom of distinguishing “originalist” from “non-originalist” 
precedent, or on the relative weights of either. For more on this distinction, see Lee J. 
Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 
BYU L. REV. 1729. 
302. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 
07-290) (question of Roberts, C.J.), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments 
/argument_transcripts/07-290.pdf. 
303. With other constitutional rights, the tug of intermediate scrutiny is irresistible because of 
what Sullivan identifies as “a crisis in analogical reasoning”—when some issue arises that 
does not fit in any of the boxes the Court has already created. See Sullivan, supra note 66, at 
297. The text of the Seventh Amendment tends to keep judges from dispensing with 
analogues altogether. 
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consign the republic to the absurdity of a federal judiciary operating exactly as 
it did in 1791, wigs and all. The Seventh Amendment text tends to cut off other 
avenues of construction except analogical reasoning. Something is 
constitutional now—the Seventh Amendment right is “preserved”—because 
something similar to it existed in 1791. 
Second Amendment originalism, at least as it has been articulated thus far, 
puts the Court in the same box methodologically that the Seventh Amendment 
does textually. According to the Court, the Second Amendment is the textual 
expression of a preexisting natural right the Founding generation understood. 
But a right to what? As stated previously, few people seriously argue that the 
right extends to tactical nuclear weapons, no matter what the dictionary says. 
Also, few people believe that the Second Amendment only guarantees a right to 
a flintlock. But the fact that Justice Scalia can only say the latter argument 
“border[s] on the frivolous”304 betrays an anxiety that needles all champions of 
originalism. Specifically, what criterion, other than the judge’s own taste or 
will, justifies his conclusion that x is “bearing” or “keeping” or an “arm” 
because something like it existed in 1791? 
A full explanation of the role of analogical reasoning in general, and among 
originalists in particular, is beyond the scope of this particular Article. 
However, the Court’s development of a historical test for the Seventh 
Amendment provides some guidance.305 First, a historical investigation is 
required. Second, the litigants must produce a sufficient data set of historical 
practices or meanings in order to accurately construe what the text demands. 
Third, the Court must acknowledge when consensus about textual meaning or 
historical practice forms a baseline for a constitutional norm, if such a 
consensus is forthcoming.306 Fourth, as Professor Lee Strang has written, 
“[W]here the Constitution’s original meaning is under- or indeterminate,” 
                                                                
304. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (emphasis added). 
305. In articulating these lessons from the Seventh Amendment, I am indebted to Professor 
Strang’s articulation of “abduced-principle originalism.” See Lee J. Strang, Originalism and 
the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which 
Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927 
(2009). Abduced-principle originalism is a method by which a court identifies a 
constitutional norm either from the semantic “uses of the constitutional term or phrase” or 
identifies the norm from “the discrete practices that the Framers and Ratifiers understood 
the constitutional text in question to prohibit, require, or permit.” Id. at 930 (emphasis 
omitted). Professor Strang does not mention the Seventh Amendment, but it appears that 
the Court has engaged in a type of abduced-principle originalism in its implementation of 
the Seventh Amendment historical test. 
306. See id. at 957 (stating that, with abduced-principle originalism, “first, a judge must identify 
the data, the archetypal practices regarding which there was a consensus” and then “put 
forward possible norms to explain the data”). 
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legislative judgments are owed some special deference.307 This deference is 
especially justified when the Constitution itself contemplates that the political 
branches will help shape a constitutional norm or institution.308 Fifth, the norm 
that is abstracted from this analogical process309 must be tested to ensure that it 
does not eliminate the reason for the constitutional provision itself 310 and to 
check that it does not “generate disturbing or even calamitous results.”311 
However the Court engages with the analogical abstraction issue in the 
Second Amendment, it has already done so in the Seventh Amendment. As 
such, the Seventh Amendment historical test offers “a general repertoire of 
doctrinal moves”312 that is “sufficiently developed”313 to be useful. Further, 
these moves, while contested in their outcomes, enjoy support from Justices 
representing a range of ideological inclinations.314 
4. A Word on Good Faith Borrowing  
Finally, one objection to using the Seventh Amendment as a model for the 
Second is that such borrowing is solely “instrumental”315 or is otherwise 
                                                                
307. Id. at 981 (“When Congress is working within the underdeterminate constitutional text, it 
may not violate the determinate original meaning that exists but, within those strictures, 
Congress can be creative.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 741, 758 (1993) (“Analogical reasoning is often silent or unhelpful on the question of 
social consequences.”). 
308. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 2 (giving Congress the power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment through “appropriate legislation”); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the 
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through “appropriate legislation”); id. amend. 
XV, § 2 (giving Congress the power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment through 
“appropriate legislation”); see also id. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress the power to “organiz[e], 
arm[], and disciplin[e] the Militia”). For more on this point, see infra note 446 and 
accompanying text. 
309. See Strang, supra note 305, at 957. 
310. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1075-77 (1990) (noting that constitutional rights must be construed so as 
not to contradict the rationale for their inclusion in the Constitution). 
311. Fallon, supra note 23, at 20 (identifying originalist historical arguments against the 
constitutionality of paper money or Social Security). 
312. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 484. 
313. Id. at 468 (discussing the elements of a “plausible act of borrowing”).  
314. See id. at 472 (arguing that transplantation from one area to another is tempting when one 
idea “possesses a track record of success in the sense that it seems defensible, has proven 
useful, or . . . enjoys support among specialists or the public”). 
315. Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97,  
98 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/97_Volokh.pdf 
(“It’s hard to see any justification for such an analogy [of the right to keep and bear arms 
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pursued in bad faith.316 At its most mild, the argument would be that the 
Seventh Amendment’s text and structure offer slim support for appropriation 
of its doctrinal apparatus to implement a fundamental right, such as the right 
to keep and bear arms, and thus such borrowing is badly misguided. At its 
most biting, the argument would be that this exercise is simply a way of 
getting at a preconceived end. 
As for the first, milder criticism, I have already stated that the Seventh 
Amendment’s appeal lies in its schematic for how to construct a historical test 
that can accomplish the practical task of turning constitutional script into rules 
of decision. The Second Amendment text is insufficiently precise to work as 
law, and the lower courts need guidance. Furthermore, they need guidance in a 
way that respects the categorical and historical approach of the Heller and 
McDonald majorities, but that is cognizant that twenty-first-century society is 
far different than eighteenth. In this limited sense, a decision to borrow from 
the Seventh Amendment can be instrumental. But so can a decision not to 
borrow.317 Conservative stalwarts have spent the last half-century urging the 
Court to be more respectful of text and history in construing constitutional 
provisions and have vetted potential judges and Justices specifically for their 
fidelity to that program. One would have to ask why, when the opportunity 
arises to rely upon a well-developed corpus of frameworks, arguments, and 
doctrine that advances that very program, they should opt for some other, 
more malleable test, drawn from some other area of law. 
As to the second, more cutting criticism, a historical test built upon the 
example of the Seventh Amendment does not necessarily lead to predictable 
pro-gun or pro-regulation positions.318 Depending on how the Court describes 
the relevant analogy, a right to keep and bear arms in a house, for example, 
could be broad or narrow.319 One of the appeals of borrowing from the Seventh 
                                                                                                                                                          
with obscenity], other than a purely instrumental one.”). 
316. Tebbe and Tsai describe good faith borrowing as “an honest desire to arrive at a defensible 
position and enhance general understanding of the law,” as opposed to bad faith borrowing, 
which is motivated not by a desire to understand, explain, or improve the law, but rather is 
“for the purpose of confusing observers, insulating a matter from accountability, or 
rendering a doctrine unusable by practitioners.” Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 468, 482. 
317. See id. at 471 (“[D]ecisions to borrow (or refusals to borrow) are [sometimes] so strained 
they seem outcome determinative.”). 
318. Cf. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (remarking 
that “just because gun regulations are assessed by reference to history and tradition” does 
not mean the government does not have latitude, and perhaps even more latitude, to craft 
regulations). 
319. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 46, at 926, 934-35 (suggesting that an armed corporate 
compound could be analogized to a large arms-bearing family). 
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Amendment historical test is that constitutional borrowing “is agnostic to 
political ideology.”320 
Finally, there are better and worse arguments about what the text and 
context of the Second Amendment might mean, as well as the consequences 
that flow from such meaning. But the historical test proposed in this Article is 
concerned primarily with articulating a workable framework within the 
parameters the Court itself has set. These parameters are simply stated: Be 
faithful to history; don’t balance; preserve as much regulation as possible. This 
Article assumes that the Court is serious about these conditions, and that it 
expects a test that complies with all three to percolate up from the lower courts. 
That a test can be bent or twisted to reach a predetermined outcome is not a 
problem unique to historically defined ones. And, if anything, to bend a 
historical test may require more mental exertion than to twist a more malleable 
intermediate scrutiny or undue burden analysis.321 
B. A Historical Test for the Second Amendment: Some Familiar Questions  
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms could be 
implemented through a historical test based on historical materials and 
common law reasoning and sources, just as the Seventh Amendment right has 
been. This approach would comply with the Court’s stated desire to avoid 
balancing and yet be flexible enough to address twenty-first-century concerns. 
However, the Court’s focus on defining the Second Amendment by history 
triggers a number of problems similar to those posed by the Seventh 
Amendment historical test. First, there is the problem of whose history. 
Second, there is the problem of how much history. And third, there is the 
problem of conflicting or indeterminate history. As I explain in this Section, 
those problems are still being worked out and are not completely resolvable. 
Nevertheless, the Court’s efforts to work through those problems in Seventh 
Amendment cases offer some useful guidance. 
1. Whose History? 
Whose history counts for the purpose of the Second Amendment historical 
test? The Seventh Amendment jury-trial right is at least textually helpful. It 
                                                                
320. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 18, at 489. 
321. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985-87 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (referring to the undue burden test as 
“unprincipled,” “standardless,” and “inherently manipulable”). 
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says “common law” and “preserved.”322 The courts agree, due in part to 
variations in colonial practice, that English common law history is the 
touchstone. The Second Amendment text is not as clear. It says the right to 
keep and bear arms shall not be “infringed.”323 Nevertheless, both Justice Scalia 
and Justice Alito have reiterated that the history that counts for purposes of the 
right comes from both English and American traditions. 
English history clearly counts for purposes of Second Amendment 
construction. Heller and McDonald both construed the right to keep and bear 
arms for self-defense as a preexisting right, one that the Constitution codifies 
but does not create.324 As Justice Scalia insisted, the Second Amendment “was 
not intended to lay down a ‘novel principl[e]’ but rather codified a right 
‘inherited from our English ancestors’”325: “By the time of the founding the 
right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects.”326 The Court 
in both Heller and McDonald referred to English sources to determine what 
precisely is the substance of the right that must not be “infringed.” The Court 
cited, among other sources,327 Blackstone’s Commentaries,328 Hawkins’s Treatise 
on the Pleas of the Crown,329 and the seventeenth-century English Bill of 
Rights330—which Heller identified as “the predecessor to our Second 
                                                                
322. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
323. Id. amend. II. 
324. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036-38 (2010); District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593, 628 (2008). 
325. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)). Compare id. 
(stating that self-defense was a preexisting right), with Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 
349-50 (1898) (stating that the Founders considered the jury trial “their birthright and 
inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced []round and 
interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power” (quoting 2 
STORY, supra note 109, § 1779, at 541)). 
326. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593; see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (noting that Heller recognizes 
this right’s key role in the American notion of liberty and its incorporation as part of the 
concept of due process); id. at 3066 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (referring to the rights contained in the Bill of Rights as “inalienable rights” that 
are merely “codifi[ed]” in the Constitution). 
327. For other English sources, see, for example, Heller, 554 U.S. at 583 n.7, 587-88 n.10. 
328. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 n.15 (citing Blackstone for the proposition that self-defense 
was a fundamental right); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 593-94 (citing Blackstone for the 
proposition that “the arms provision of the Bill of Rights [was] one of the fundamental 
rights of Englishmen”). 
329. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582. 
330. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036; Heller, 554 U.S. at 593; see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3064 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (referring to the English 
Bill of Rights for the antecedents of fundamental rights such as the right to bear arms). 
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Amendment.”331 According to the Court, English history must inform how the 
Second Amendment right is to be construed.332 
But American history counts as well. Justice Alito in McDonald concluded 
that the right to keep and bear arms applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered 
liberty”333—it is a right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”334 
Heller cited “Postratification Commentary” by the likes of St. George Tucker335 
and Joseph Story,336 “Pre-Civil War Case Law”337 (including from states that 
did not exist in 1791),338 “Post-Civil War Legislation”339 and “Post-Civil War 
Commentators,”340 in support of its construction of the Second Amendment as 
protecting an individual right. McDonald cited legislation and cases and other 
materials from the Reconstruction period. As one lower court has stated, 
“[W]hen state- or local-government action is challenged, the focus of the 
original-meaning inquiry is carried forward in time; the Second Amendment’s 
scope as a limitation on the States depends on how the right was understood 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified [in 1868].”341 
Consequently, the history that matters for Second Amendment purposes 
appears to be not just English history, as it is in the Seventh Amendment, but 
rather a particular Anglo-American mix of history. 
                                                                
331. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593. For a similar proposition, see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3064 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
332. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 593; cf. Patrick Charles, Scribble Scrabble, The Second Amendment, and 
Historical Guideposts: A Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Malcolm, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY 227 (2010) (using English historical sources to understand the bounds of 
permissible firearm regulation). 
333. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036. 
334. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).  
335. Heller, 554 U.S. at 606. 
336. Id. at 608.  
337. Id. at 610-14.  
338. Id. at 613 (citing State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 
154 (1840)). 
339. Id. at 614-16. 
340. Id. at 616-19. 
341. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011). As I have mentioned elsewhere, 
using Reconstruction understandings of Founding-era rights is deeply problematic. See 
Miller, supra note 76, at 1327-36, 1347-49 (discussing problems with claiming natural rights 
to rebellion and self-defense in the Reconstruction era); Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion 
and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 940-74 (2011) [hereinafter, Miller, Retail Rebellion] 
(discussing the problems that arise when the English common law right to resist unlawful 
arrest is interpreted in light of the reality of Reconstruction violence). 
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2. How Much History?  
Although Anglo-American history is relevant to the construction of the 
Second Amendment, that still leaves the question: How much history? As with 
the Seventh Amendment, this raises two issues. The first is temporal: The 
Second Amendment concerns history over what period of time? The second, 
more substantive question, mirrors that posed by the Seventh Amendment: 
How much of that history is now constitutional law? In particular, how much of 
the Anglo-American common law of self-defense, or tort, or criminal law, did 
the Second Amendment put beyond the powers of legislatures, executives, and 
courts, and, conversely, how much was left to these institutions? 
As to the first question, the Court in Heller and McDonald did not feel 
confined to the history of the right to keep and bear arms in 1791, but drew 
upon sources dating as late as a century later. The historical sweep of the 
Second Amendment’s construction clusters, very roughly, around three eras: 
English and preconstitutional American history, American antebellum history, 
and Reconstruction and its close contemporaries. 
The second question—how much of that history is now constitutional 
law—is far more difficult to answer. Heller and McDonald both describe  
self-defense as the “central component” of the Second Amendment right.342 
They also both declare that the right to have firearms for “the core lawful 
purpose of self defense”343 is a right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”344 But neither Heller nor McDonald explains how deep those roots 
penetrate. It is apparent that the common law right to self-defense is 
constitutionalized to some degree.345 But how much? Is all of self-defense 
common law as it existed in 1791, or 1868, or somewhere in between now 
constitutional law?346 The McDonald Court cited Blackstone for the proposition 
that if one kills an attacker, “the slayer is in no kind of fault whatsoever, not 
even in the minutest degree; and is therefore to be totally acquitted and 
                                                                
342. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (emphasis omitted); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3036 (2010) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 599). 
343. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 571). 
344. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
345. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the World, 59 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 247-49 (2008) (arguing that Heller made self-defense law part of the 
Second Amendment rather than the Ninth Amendment or common law). As Laurence Tribe 
and Michael Dorf wrote with respect to “a right to be left alone,” the right to self-defense 
“cannot serve as a constitutional rule of decision”; some “less abstract formulation of the 
right” is necessary to be constitutionally meaningful. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1067. 
346. See infra Subsection III.B.3 for conflicting common law. 
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discharged, with commendation rather than blame.”347 If the Second 
Amendment merely reflects a preexisting right inherited from the English, is 
Blackstone’s commentary now part of that right? Just the part about acquittal? 
What do we do with the fact that in 1791 there was a common law right to 
resist an illegal arrest with force?348 Is that now part of the Second 
Amendment? At common law, private or quasi-private parties could enforce 
criminal law, for example, through the “hue and cry” and the posse comitatus.349 
These types of collective arms bearing for self-defense stretched over three 
hundred years of Anglo-American history. Are they now constitutional 
rights?350 
 Common law customs have been “constitutionalized” in other areas.351 But 
there has not been a coherent system to decide what common law is 
constitutional law and what is not. Further, the history of the Court’s 
constitutionalization of the common law is a decidedly mixed bag.352 The Court 
has, in the past, constitutionalized the common law defense of truth to an 
allegation of libel,353 common law liberty-of-contract values to an allegation of 
                                                                
347. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 n.15 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at *182). 
348. See Miller, Retail Rebellion, supra note 341, at 945-59 (discussing the Second Amendment’s 
effect on the right to resist arrest). 
349. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29 (1993) 
(noting the hazy distinction in colonial America between public and private law enforcement 
and between mob violence and common law tradition); cf. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 
1503 (2012) (observing that in 1871 “it was common for criminal cases to be prosecuted by 
private parties”). 
350. For more on the problems associated with the constitutionalization of self-defense law, see 
Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal Law, 
Grammatically Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment Musings, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
1205 (2009). 
351. See Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for 
Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 477 n.60 (2005) (referring to 
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), as the “constitutionaliz[ation]” of the 
voluntariness doctrine in self-incrimination cases); Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action 
and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779, 802 (2004) (referring to the Lochner era as 
“constitutionaliz[ing] . . . common law rules [of property, contract, and tort] as the baseline 
from which to identify public regulation”); Sklansky, supra note 22, at 1808 (describing 
Justice Scalia’s search-and-seizure jurisprudence as “constitutionalized common law”).  
352. For more on the “checkered history” of constitutionalized common law and a taxonomy, see 
Samuel C. Kaplan, “Grab Bag of Principles” or Principled Grab Bag?: The Constitutionalization 
of Common Law, 49 S.C. L. REV. 463, 464-72 (1998).  
353. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964) (stating that the First Amendment rule in 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), “absolutely prohibits punishment of 
truthful criticism”); Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, 296 (Alaska 1978) (stating that “the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that truth be an absolute 
defense” to defamation where public officials, figures, or issues are involved). 
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racial discrimination,354 and the common law right to recover humans as 
chattel.355 
The problem that the Court faces today with the Second Amendment is the 
same one it faced with the Seventh Amendment in Dimick: When does 
“adaptation to new circumstances and situations” by courts or legislatures 
cease, and an “alter[ation] [of] the Constitution” begin?356 Beyond a poorly 
delineated right to self-defense in the home, the Court has not stated how 
much common law, of any source, is now Second Amendment law. Section 
III.C, infra, will offer at least some guidance on how to approach this question 
of how deep the common law may reach into constitutional law. 
3. What About Conflicting or Indeterminate History? 
Assuming that the history that counts for Second Amendment purposes is 
Anglo-American history up to and including 1791, and solely American history 
up to and including 1868, and assuming that some unknown quantity of that 
history is now constitutionalized, we still have a problem of conflicting and 
indeterminate history.357 Indeed, it is hard to imagine periods more fraught 
with conflict and indeterminacy than those surrounding the nation’s Founding 
and the Civil War.  
Consider this minor sampling of historical conflicts358:  
At the time of the Founding, a group of persons could attack a law 
enforcement officer if those persons correctly determined that the officer was 
                                                                
354. See Peller & Tushnet, supra note 351, at 802 (“[T]he protection of private liberty to choose 
contractual partners entailed the constitutional nullification of anti-discrimination laws that 
would take this choice out of private hands.”); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 15, 
25 (1883) (holding that private discrimination is not the proper target of Reconstruction 
legislation and exceeds the Tenth Amendment). 
355. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 613 (1842) (holding that the common law 
right of “recaption” applies to human property as recognized in the Fugitive Slave Clause). 
For more on the constitutionalization of common law customs with respect to slavery, see 
Darrell A.H. Miller, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Regulation of Custom, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1811 (2012). For more on the constitutionalization of the common law in general, see 
Kaplan, supra note 352, at 464-72. 
356. Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935). In this sense, I understand 
“constitutionalization” of common law slightly differently from Kaplan, who suggests that 
the Court is doing so as an alternative to “assess[ing] the meaning of the [Constitution’s] 
text, history and structure.” Kaplan, supra note 352, at 467. 
357. See Eskridge, supra note 270, at 194 (“Tradition is rarely simple and univocal; it is 
multifarious, evolving, and complicated.”). 
358. For additional examples of historical conflict, see Massey, supra note 57, at 1095-1125. 
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behaving against the Magna Carta.359 During the same period, a select militia of 
Massachusetts business elites put down an incipient guerilla campaign of 
fellow Massachusetts citizens who opposed taxes and marched in defense of 
their “first principles [of] natural self-preservation.”360 
In 1788, James Madison suggested that the American right to arms is “a 
barrier against the enterprises of ambition.”361 Six years later, President George 
Washington crushed an uprising of Pennsylvania frontiersmen who had used 
those constitutionally guaranteed arms to attack federal officers on the ground 
that they had subverted the Constitution.362 
During Reconstruction, both black freedmen and white Klan members 
claimed to be a repressed minority, disarmed and threatened by lawless militia 
forces and criminals, and possessed of a right to keep and carry arms for  
self-defense against those hostile forces.363 
                                                                
359. See Queen v. Tooley, (1709) 92 Eng. Rep. 349, 353 (K.B.), 2 Ld. Raym. 1296. 
360. Luke Day’s Demands to William Shepard, Jan. 25, 1787, reprinted in HAMPSHIRE  
GAZETTE, Feb. 7, 1787, http://shaysrebellion.stcc.edu/shaysapp/artifact.do?shortName 
=gazette_ld7feb87.  
361. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
362. See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 214 (1997); see also Massey, supra 
note 57, at 1102, 1105 (discussing Madison and the Whiskey Rebellion).  
363. Compare ORGANIZATION AND PRINCIPLES OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (1868), reprinted in 1 
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 499, 500 (Henry Steele Commager & Milton Cantor 
eds., 10th ed. 1988) (identifying one principle as “the inalienable right of self-preservation of 
the people against the exercise of arbitrary and unlicensed power”), PROCEEDINGS IN THE KU 
KLUX TRIALS AT COLUMBIA, S.C. IN THE UNITED STATES—CIRCUIT COURT, NOVEMBER 
TERM, 1871, at 150-51, 425-26 (Benn Pitman & Louis Freeland Post eds., Columbia, S.C., 
Republican Printing Co. 1872) (defending Klan members’ gun rights on the basis that 
whites needed to protect themselves from better-armed blacks), and Hearing Before the Select 
Committee To Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States (1871) 
(statement of John B. Gordon), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION (1865-1877), at 98, 99 
(Richard N. Current ed., 1965) (calling the Klan “nothing more and nothing less . . . [than] 
an organization . . . [of] the peaceable, law-abiding citizens of the State, for  
self-protection”), with STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 
AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876, at 60 (1998) (quoting a letter from a group of 
freedmen to a Freedmen’s Bureau official complaining of a seizure of arms by local law 
enforcement), LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF 
SLAVERY 290 (1979) (quoting a letter from a black woman who complained to the 
Freedmen’s Bureau of the fact that blacks were not allowed to have arms to defend 
themselves), McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3039 (2010) (“Throughout the 
South, armed parties, often consisting of ex-Confederate soldiers serving in the state 
militias, forcibly took firearms from newly freed slaves.”), and id. at 3088 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The use of firearms for self-defense 
was often the only way black citizens could protect themselves from mob violence.”). For 
more on this conflict, see Saul Cornell & Justin Florence, The Right To Bear Arms in the Era 
of the Fourteenth Amendment: Gun Rights or Gun Regulation?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1043, 
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Conflict exists even at the fine-grained level of common law doctrine and 
historical regulation. At English common law, a man was permitted to 
assemble an armed retinue in his house,364 but if he left home with the same 
retinue, the entire party could be charged with a crime.365 In Woodroe v. State, a 
Texas court stated that “[a] party may act in self-defense in a difficulty, and at 
the same time violate the law against carrying a pistol.”366 But in State v. 
Huntley, a North Carolina court stated that “the carrying of a gun per se 
constitutes no offence.”367 In Texas in 1871, a pistol was not an “arm” as that 
term is used in the Second Amendment.368 In Georgia in 1846, it was.369 
Even assuming one could artfully construct a seamless narrative within a 
historical era—for example, the Founding or Reconstruction respectively—there 
is undeniable tension between these historical periods. The private use of 
firearms in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in service of crime 
fighting was considered part of one’s civic duty and a public good.370 The 
                                                                                                                                                          
1063 (2010), which discusses Klan defenses during South Carolina trials; and Miller, supra 
note 76, at 1329-36 (discussing the irony that the logic and historic appeals used to support 
freedmen’s right to bear arms were just as likely to be used by Confederates and Klan 
members). 
364. 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 158 (Garland Publ’g 1978) 
(1716) (“[A]n assembly of a man’s friends in his own house, for the defence of the 
possession thereof . . . is indulged by law . . . .” (spelling modernized)). 
365. See Queen v. Soley, (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 935, 937 (Q.B.) (“Though a man may ride with 
arms, yet he cannot take two with him to defend himself even though his life is threatened; 
for he is in protection of the law, which is sufficient for his defence.” (footnote omitted)); 
see also Green v. State, 35 S.E. 97, 100-01 (Ga. 1900) (finding that an assembly of persons 
“by intimidation resulting from possession of arms” is a riot “though no specific act of 
violence is committed” (citing Soley, 88 Eng. Rep. at 936-37)); A Friend to Freedom from 
Sentiment, Cyder-Act Subversive of Civil Liberty, 33 GENTLEMEN’S MAG. & HIST. CHRON. 446, 
447 (1763) (“If a man be in his house and hears that others are coming there to beat him, it is 
lawful for him to assemble his friends, in his house, for the safety of his person; but if a man 
be threatened to be beaten out of his house, it is not lawful for him to make such assembly; 
for he hath another remedy by surety of the peace.” (spelling modernized)). 
366. 96 S.W. 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1906). 
367. 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 422-23 (1843). 
368. See English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1871). 
369. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (holding that the carrying of an unconcealed pistol is 
protected); see also Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 93 (1822) (holding that a 
concealed cane sword falls within the state constitutional guarantee of the right to keep and 
bear arms). 
370. See, e.g., JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGIN OF AN  
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 2-4 (1994) (discussing private duties to protect oneself and others 
at English common law). 
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private use of firearms during Reconstruction, in sharp contrast, was part of a 
campaign of racial and political terrorism.371 
Finally, as with the Seventh Amendment, the Second Amendment presents 
the problems of judicial competence, analogical abstraction, and policy choice. 
Judges are no more equipped to make judgments about the reliability of 
historical evidence during Reconstruction than they are to determine which 
writ would have been brought in the Court of Exchequer in 1791.372 For 
example, Texas passed a law during Reconstruction that targeted public  
arms bearing as a way to reduce the risk of confrontations between pro- and 
anti-Union forces.373 Some commentators have discounted this law on the 
theory that the Texas government was—to conservative Southerners, at least—an 
unpopular Republican puppet.374 Does the mere fact that ex-Confederates 
hated Reconstruction government make Reconstruction history unreliable? If 
it does, what does that say about the Fourteenth Amendment itself, as that 
Amendment exists as a result of military compulsion?375 
                                                                
371. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3039 (2010) (noting the predations of the 
unreconstructed Southern militia); see also Hearing Before the Select Committee To Inquire into 
the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States, supra note 363, at 101 (calling the 
Klan “a peace police—a law-abiding concern”). 
372. Compare McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3117 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“No mechanical yardstick can 
measure which of us [the Heller majority or dissent] was correct, either with respect to the 
[historical] materials we chose to privilege or the insights we gleaned from them.”), with 
Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 576 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (disparaging judges’ ability to distinguish between 
historical writs). 
373. See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 
1359, 1430 (identifying Texas at that time as “under a Reconstruction government very 
much concerned with Confederate sympathizers”); see also Editorial, A Question for  
Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1874, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res 
=9406E5DF143BEF34BC4952DFB366838F669FDE (lamenting the gun violence in Arkansas 
and advocating Texas-model restrictions on the right to carry firearms). 
374. E.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right To Bear Arms in Texas: The Intent of the Framers of the 
Bills of Rights, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 629, 661 (1989) (referring to the Texas court at the time as 
“a product of military occupation”); James R. Norvell, Oran M. Roberts and the Semicolon 
Court, 37 TEX. L. REV. 279, 292 (1959) (remarking upon, without directly endorsing, “[a] 
Texas law tradition . . . whereby we disregard as precedents the decisions of our 
Reconstruction courts”). 
375. Professor Kent Greenawalt, for instance, has observed that “serious questions can be raised 
about the original validity of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments,” including the fact 
that the latter was proposed by a Congress without former Confederate representation and 
that ex-Confederate states had to ratify it to be readmitted to the Union. Kent Greenawalt, 
Hart’s Rule of Recognition and the United States, 1 RATIO JURIS 40, 45 (1988). For similar 
ruminations on an even broader level, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West 
Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291 (2002), which discusses the implications of 
the fact that West Virginia broke away from Virginia as a result of the Civil War. One could 
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Even if judges had the time and resources to amass the historical sources, 
the looming issue of analogical abstraction remains. As Judge Sutton recently 
observed, “[l]evel of generality is destiny in interpretive disputes.”376  
In interpreting the word “bear” in the Second Amendment, do the  
eighteenth-century restrictions on “riding or going armed with dangerous or 
unusual weapons”377 encompass all forms of “riding” (as on a train, or airplane, 
or coach) or only those forms of “riding” that can be done individually (as on a 
horse or a motorcycle)? Does the historic restriction on carrying arms in fairs, 
markets, and in the presence of the King’s ministers378 apply today anywhere 
people congregate, any place the state controls, or just where people buy things 
or where police officers or other government agents are stationed?379 
These are just some of the multiple crosscurrents, complexities, and 
ambiguities that the history of Anglo-American arms bearing presents. One 
nineteenth-century legal scholar sums up the frustration: 
On the one hand, as long as the machinery which society has afforded 
for the prevention of private injuries remains in its present ineffective 
state, society cannot justly require the individual to surrender . . . the 
means of self-protection in seasons of personal danger . . . . On the 
other hand, the peace of society and the safety of peaceable citizens 
plead loudly for protection against the evils which result from 
permitting other citizens to go armed with dangerous weapons, and the 
                                                                                                                                                          
pursue the question of legitimacy to its logical end, questioning the authority of a 
constitution that was neither proposed nor ratified by women, African Americans, or the 
unpropertied. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1074.  
376. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 560 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring 
in part and in the judgment), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3713 (U.S. June 29, 2012) (No. 11-
117), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
377. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at *148. 
378. See Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3, § 3 (Eng.) (prohibiting persons from going 
or riding “armed by Night [or] by Day, in Fairs, Markets, [or] in the Presence of the Justices 
or other Ministers”). 
379. A number of gun-rights scholars interpret this statute as only prohibiting arms in public 
when accompanied by circumstances that would tend to cause terror or fear in the populace. 
See, e.g., C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 695, 716-17 (2009) (making this point); Volokh, supra note 315 (same). Other scholars 
take a different view. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 332, at 237-40 (challenging this 
interpretation and providing historical sources). The debate over what to make of this 
historical fact only reinforces my contention that the Court must come up with a 
methodology that explains how much of the common law, including its exceptions, is now 
constitutional law. 
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utmost that the law can hope to do is to strike some sort of balance 
between these apparently conflicting rights.380  
One may quibble with the extent of the disagreement, but one cannot 
maintain that there is historical certainty in this area.381 The question, of 
course, is what to do with this history. 
As discussed in Part II, the Court has created a historical test for the 
Seventh Amendment that attempts to implement the text, notwithstanding 
these historical problems of Seventh Amendment construction, and avoids, as 
much as possible, overt use of interest balancing or levels of scrutiny. Given 
that the Second Amendment presents a similar set of problems, an analogous 
test might be structured for the Second Amendment. 
C. A Second Amendment Historical Test: Boundary Setting and Tailoring 
To restate the riddle from the Introduction: What test adheres to the 
Second Amendment’s past, rejects “balancing” the right against present 
government interests, and preserves all but the most draconian regulations for 
the future?  
A historical test modeled on the Seventh Amendment may be a partial 
solution. Such a test might take the following form: First, does the asserted 
right to “keep” or “bear” or to a particular “arm” have a clear or arguable 
historical analogue? If it does, then it can be said to implicate the Second 
Amendment.382 If it does not, there is no Second Amendment right. Assuming 
                                                                
380. The Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence, 1 CENT. L.J. 259, 287 (1874). 
381. Professor Volokh has, I think, misread my prior work as standing for the proposition that 
history points in one indubitable position with regard to arms bearing, and public arms 
bearing in particular. See Volokh, supra note 315. I reiterate here that “while the text and 
history are not definitive, there are better and worse interpretations of the record, and there 
are zones of greater and less agreement as to textual and historical scope.” Miller, supra note 
76, at 1311. Professor Volokh and others may disagree with me about the extent, or the 
jurisprudential relevance, of this historical conflict and indeterminacy, but they cannot 
reasonably claim that this conflict and ambivalence do not exist. 
382. In this sense, Nelson Lund’s focus on the analogue for the restriction jumps the gun. In a 
short aside in a longer piece, Professor Lund suggested: 
Modern gun control regulations would then be upheld only if they had close 
analogues in identifiable common law or statutory restrictions in place at that 
time, just as modern causes of action are covered by the Seventh Amendment only 
if they are more like cases that in 1791 would have been tried at law rather than in 
equity. 
  Lund, supra note 35, at 1354-55 (2009). But the first question must be whether the asserted 
“keeping” or “bearing” or “arm” is even within the contemplation of the Second 
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the right asserted has a clear or colorable historical analogue, the second part of 
the test asks whether the regulation “infringes” upon the right to keep and bear 
arms. Here, infringement means something similar to a failure to preserve in 
the Seventh Amendment context, i.e., a law that regulates keeping or bearing 
an arm so thoroughly as to destroy the fundamental nature of the right. 
Regulations that have precise common law or historical antecedents or 
analogues do not infringe upon the right; newer regulations grounded in 
precedent or functional considerations do not infringe upon the right so long 
as they retain the Second Amendment right in its essential features. 
The following Subsection discusses both elements of the test. 
1. Boundary Setting 
The first part of the historical test asks whether the asserted type of 
keeping, bearing, or arm falls within the ambit of the Second Amendment text. 
Keeping, bearing, or arms that are directly supported by history or have a 
colorable historical analogue fall within the protections of the Second 
Amendment text. Keeping, bearing, or arms that have no historical or colorable 
historical analogue do not. This portion of the test recognizes that to determine 
whether a certain keeping, bearing, or arm falls within the ambit of the text, 
one must go beyond the text to examine the history, statutes, and customs 
surrounding that text.383 
At this point, the problem of choosing an appropriate analogue becomes 
critical. If the boundaries for Second Amendment analogues are set at too high 
a level of abstraction, they become unmoored from both history and reason. 
For example, if the historical analogue to “keeping” and “bearing” is simply 
any historical example of “possessing” or “carrying” a weapon, then the Second 
Amendment right devours all.384 Restrictions on the possession of firearms by 
criminals, children, the mentally ill, or potential terrorists, as well as on the 
carrying of firearms in prisons, kindergarten classes, insane asylums, and the 
                                                                                                                                                          
Amendment, not whether the regulation is. 
383. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008) (explaining that the scope of 
Second Amendment is not in its text but in its history); see also Borough of Duryea v. 
Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2503 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(referring to the Petition Clause of the First Amendment as a “pre-existing individual right, 
which means that we must look to historical practice to determine its scope” (citing Heller, 
554 U.S. at 579, 592)). 
384. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[T]he [Second Amendment] right was not a right to keep and 
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”); see 
also Miller, supra note 76, at 1287 (noting that the Court “stopped short of careening off the 
textualist precipice”). 
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White House, fall within the scope of the Second Amendment and cannot be 
infringed in their fundamentals. If the historical analogue to an “arm” is 
“anything that can be carried in the hand for defense,” then hand grenades and 
anthrax fall within the boundaries of Second Amendment protection, and no 
amount of tailoring can keep them out of private armories. 
Conversely, pitching the abstraction too narrowly risks the near-“frivolous”385 
argument that only muskets and black powder count as “arms,” or that 
hanging a gun above the mantle is the only type of “keep[ing]” that counts. Or, 
equally pernicious, too narrow an abstraction produces a “radical 
reductionism”386 in which the Second Amendment splinters. What results is 
that the knife, the pistol, the rifle, the city, the suburb, the highway, and the 
sidewalk each becomes “a law unto itself.”387 
One way to address the analogy abstraction problem is to look for historical 
consensus at the narrowest level of specificity that is functional as a rule of 
decision. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has written, “The need to produce a 
theory of meaning that is also adequate to justify the judicial role constrains the 
level of abstraction”;388 judges must “enforce . . . only the portion of the text or 
rule sufficiently complete and general to count as law.”389 The roots of this 
approach come from none other than the author of Heller himself. In Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., Justice Scalia stated that the level of generality at which to 
assess a constitutional right is “the most specific level at which a relevant 
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be 
identified.”390 
The Court has stated that the Second Amendment protects a preexisting 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. It has also stated that 
“[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to 
have when the people adopted them.”391 But that right has been subject to 
numerous types of regulation by statute and common law throughout 
                                                                
385. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582. 
386. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1071. 
387. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (observing that each 
of “[t]he moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and 
the street corner orator” is “a law unto itself” when it comes to First Amendment 
protection); see also Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1070 (discussing Kovacs).  
388. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 376 (1992).  
389. Id. 
390. 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined this portion of the 
opinion. 
391. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).  
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history,392 including outright bans on the public bearing of weapons.393 Since 
balancing is not permitted,394 one must look to historical consensus for a limit. 
Is there an indisputable place where, for example, “keeping” and “bearing” an 
“arm” was permitted as a matter of historical practice? As I have written 
elsewhere, there appears to be a strong historical consensus—from ancient 
history to the modern era—that the one indisputable place one could keep and 
bear arms was in the home, for the purpose of self-defense.395 
But the framework outlined here does not require a court to articulate the 
right at that particular level of specificity. The right could be articulated at 
higher levels of abstraction. For instance, it could be described as a right to bear 
arms for self-defense in any circumstance in which one is threatened with 
imminent injury or death.396 Imminence as a method of construing the scope of 
the right to self-defense has a long pedigree.397 More broadly, the right could 
                                                                
392. For a listing of such regulations, see Charles, supra note 57, at 23-26 & nn.77-85. 
393. See, e.g., WYO. COMP. LAWS ch. 52 § 1 (1876), codified in WYO. STAT. § 980 (1887) 
(“Hereafter it shall be unlawful for any resident of any city, town or village, or for any one 
not a resident of any city, town or village, in said territory, but a sojourner therein, to bear 
upon his person, concealed or openly, any fire-arm or other deadly weapon, within the 
limits of any city, town or village.”); Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.) 
(“[N]o Man great nor small, of what Condition soever he be, except the King’s Servants in 
his Presence, and his Ministers in executing of the King’s Precepts . . . be so hardy to . . . go 
nor ride armed by Night nor by Day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the Presence of the Justices or 
other Ministers, nor in no Part elsewhere, upon Pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, 
and their Bodies to Prison at the King’s Pleasure.”); ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, THE CATTLE 
TOWNS 121 (1968) (noting that local statutes in Kansas prohibited “the carrying of 
dangerous weapons of any type, concealed or otherwise, by persons other than law 
enforcement officers”). Some argue that these laws prohibited the carrying of arms only 
when carried “in terrorem populi” (that is to the terror of the people) or argue that laws like 
the Statute of Northampton were seldom enforced, or that they are outliers, and therefore 
should not be considered constitutionalized historical limits on the right to keep and bear 
arms. See Marshall, supra note 379, 716-17. But those arguments are question begging, and 
only underscore the need for a theory of which historical or common law limitations count 
as part of the constitutional law and which limitations do not. See 6 Madison, supra note 
19, at 379 (“Is it to be the common law with or without the British statutes?”). 
394. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
395. See Miller, supra note 76, at 1350. 
396. Cf. 1879 Tex. Crim. Stat. 319 (providing an exception to the prohibition on carrying arms 
for “persons traveling” or “one who has reasonable ground for fearing an unlawful attack 
upon his person” when the danger is “imminent and threatening”). 
397. See, e.g., id.; Pierson v. State, 12 Ala. 149, 153 (1847) (stating that  
Alabama law “is derived from, and the same as, the common law of England,” which 
provides that there is no claim of self-defense “unless the assault . . . is such as to produce a 
well-grounded apprehension of im[m]inent danger to life or limb”); cf. U.S. CONST. art. I,  
§ 10, cl. 3 (forbidding a state from “engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”). 
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be articulated as a right to keep and bear arms for self-defense anywhere one 
has a reasonable apprehension of violence. Or, even more broadly, as the right 
to keep and bear arms for self-defense anywhere one has a right to be. Of 
course, specifying the right at these higher levels of generality “portend[s] all 
sorts of litigation over schools, airports, parks, public thoroughfares, and 
various additional government facilities,”398 as well as litigation over use of 
firearms against law enforcement.399 
The object of this Article is not to state definitively at what level of 
generality the right to keep and bear arms should be specified, but to help 
frame how the question should be asked. A number of issues could guide a 
court’s judgment in specifying whether a type of keeping, bearing, or arm has a 
common law analogue. The first is to recognize that some value judgments are 
inescapable.400 But just because they are inescapable does not mean the choice 
of level of abstraction must be untethered from text or consequence.401 Any 
decision about any one of these essential terms—keep, bear, arm—must fall 
within certain “widely shared beliefs of what makes sense”402 with regard to the 
text and history. The decision must also be functional,403 in that it must 
“provide stable meaning that can be used to resolve a legal issue,”404 and must 
interact with other constitutional text and norms, such as equal protection, due 
process,405 federalism,406 and participatory democracy. And, as discussed above, 
                                                                
398. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Volokh, Implementing the Right, supra note 76, 
at 1515). 
399. See Miller, Retail Rebellion, supra note 341, at 939 (discussing the implications of Second 
Amendment history with respect to self-defense against the police). 
400. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1087 (“Judges must choose among competing traditions 
those which will receive legal protection—and [that] choice . . . requires value judgments.”). 
401. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 16 
(2005) (“[I]nstitutions and methods of interpretation must be designed . . . [to be] sustainable 
. . . and capable of translating the people’s will into sound policies.”). 
402. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1076.  
403. See id. at 1099 (“Abstraction pushes us constantly to check practice against principle.”). 
404. Eskridge, supra note 270, at 194. 
405. See Donofrio v. City of New York, No. 04-CV-3336, 2009 WL 6388381, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 24, 2009) (discussing due process rights in handgun licenses). For more on these 
implications, see Miller, Retail Rebellion, supra note 341, at 971-74. 
406. The concern with federalism has two components, the first being how much of state law to 
displace through the Second Amendment, and the other being the issue of “lateral 
federalism” between states. Courts should be cautious of too heavy a reliance on 
constitutional construction that “privilege[s] the traditions of a great number of states over 
those of the few.” Kaplan, supra note 352, at 475 (discussing lateral federalism in 
constitutional cases). 
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courts should avoid choosing a level of abstraction that is “prone to 
generat[ing] disturbing or calamitous results,”407 as opposed to an analogy that 
“leave[s] more room for discretionary judgment.”408 As Judge Easterbrook has 
written, the ability to choose a level of abstraction is itself a type of power. At 
least with regard to the Second Amendment, it seems that the level of 
generality ought to be one that is “capable of justifying a judicial role. Unless it 
is possible to find an answer that adequately differentiates judicial from 
political action, the judge should allow political and private actors to proceed 
on their way . . . .”409 This point is apt when textual features of the 
Constitution, as well as history and tradition, contemplate that the political 
branches and the states will retain authority to regulate arms and to discipline 
arms bearers,410 especially when those arms are borne publicly for purposes of 
confrontation. 
Finally, it should be noted that, as with the Seventh Amendment, the 
Second Amendment is a floor, not a ceiling. States, through their own 
constitutions, and Congress, through its commerce or Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement powers, have the ability to grant greater rights through positive 
law, as they have done on many occasions.411 
2. Tailoring  
Once the court has concluded that the Second Amendment’s text covers 
keeping, or bearing, or arm, the second part of the test asks whether the 
restriction amounts to an infringement. In this circumstance, an infringement 
means something similar to what it means in the Seventh Amendment: a 
                                                                
407. Fallon, supra note 23, at 20 (identifying originalist historical arguments against the 
constitutionality of paper money or Social Security). 
408. Id. at 6. 
409. Easterbrook, supra note 388, at 372. 
410. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress power to “organiz[e], arm[], and disciplin[e]” 
the militia, and giving states authority to designate the leaders of such militias); id. amend. 
II (providing that arms are protected because of the need for a “well regulated” militia). 
411. See, e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, § 512 (2009) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1a-7b (2006)) (protecting gun 
owners in national parks); Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (protecting the gun industry from some state tort suits); Britt v. 
State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 321-22 (N.C. 2009) (holding that a state felon-in-possession statute 
violates the state constitutional right to keep and bear arms when applied to a nonviolent 
felon with a superannuated record); Stephen R. McAllister, Individual Rights Under a System 
of Dual Sovereignty: The Right To Keep and Bear Arms, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 867, 881-82 (2011) 
(observing the change in the Kansas Constitution expanding the right to keep and bear arms 
(citing KAN. CONST., BILL OF RIGHTS § 4 (2010)).  
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regulation that destroys the right in its fundamentals. If the regulation does 
not destroy the right in its fundamentals, then it simply regulates an incident 
of the right, much as changes to the number of jurors or procedural 
innovations like the directed verdict do not fail to preserve the Seventh 
Amendment right to trial by jury.412 
Admittedly, history is no keener an instrument for making Second 
Amendment distinctions than it is for making the Seventh Amendment 
distinctions.413 Courts will often have to decide cases “without the benefit of 
any foolproof test.”414 Nevertheless, the Court’s framework for the jury-trial 
right is instructive here as well. The tailoring function begins with historical 
analogues. As Chief Justice Roberts suggested in Heller, just as there are 
modern arms that are “lineal descendents” of those arms referred to in the 
Second Amendment, “presumably there are lineal descendents of the 
restrictions [on firearms] as well.”415 A well-established historical restriction, or 
its modern analogue, demonstrates that that right has not been infringed in its 
fundamentals. In much the same way, a rule restricting the number of jurors to 
twelve adults could not be a Seventh Amendment violation because twelve 
jurors was a well-established limitation on jury size in 1791.416 Where history is 
unclear, the court moves to precedent.417 For example, although there may be 
no historical analogue to police officers temporarily sequestering weapons from 
persons during the course of a temporary stop, a storehouse of precedent 
upholding such limited sequesters may answer the Second Amendment 
question.418 Where precedent is unclear, the court resorts to functional 
                                                                
412. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (holding that a jury of six members 
rather than twelve does not violate the right to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment). 
413. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377-78 (1996) (stating that history is 
a “pretty blunt instrument for drawing distinctions”). 
414. Id. at 377. 
415. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 
07-290) (question of Roberts, C.J.)). 
416. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899) (stating that the English common law 
understanding is that a jury shall be of twelve men). But see Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 156 
(holding that a six-member jury satisfies the Seventh Amendment). 
417. Cf. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384 (consulting precedent “since evidence of common-law practice 
at the time of the framing” did not answer the question of the meaning of the Seventh 
Amendment’s jury guarantee). 
418. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment permits “a 
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to 
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he 
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime”). 
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considerations.419 Functional considerations, however, are not completely 
open-ended. They are measured against the fundamentals of the right as 
assessed by the historical nature of the right. That is, in the Seventh 
Amendment context, the key functional consideration is the traditional 
distinction between the judge’s role to decide matters of law and the jury’s role 
to decide matters of fact.420 Procedural innovations that eliminate this basic 
division of labor between the judge and the jury destroy the right in its 
fundamentals. 
This focus on fundamentals, of course, begs the question: what are the 
Second Amendment’s fundamentals? One way of identifying those 
“fundamentals” is to examine “whether the practices mandated or proscribed 
by the [Second Amendment] presuppose some view without which the textual 
requirements are incoherent.”421 The Second Amendment, like the Seventh 
Amendment, is a right designed to “prevent government oppression.”422 But 
this fundamental right is, and must be, inchoate.423 Clearly, widespread 
confiscation of all firearms makes the textual language incoherent: there is no 
reason to guarantee the right if regulations that are the equivalent to 
confiscation are legitimate. But short of confiscation, it is difficult to say that 
historical analogues to prohibitions on taking arms into schools or police 
stations make the text incoherent.424 So long as there is an arguable analogue to 
                                                                
419. Cf. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (“Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, 
functional considerations also play their part in the choice between judge and jury to define 
terms of art.”). 
420. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720 (1999) (noting 
the predominant role of the jury in deciding matters of fact); Markman, 517 U.S. at 377 
(same). 
421. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1063.  
422. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (applying this reasoning to the Seventh 
Amendment); cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008) (“[W]hen the 
able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist 
tyranny.”). For more on the link between the right to arms and the right to a jury, see AKHIL 
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 324-25 (2005). 
423. The Constitution’s text contemplates the suppression of rebellions and the punishment of 
traitors. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing for the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus during rebellion); id. art. III, § 3 (defining treason); id. art. IV, § 4 (providing for the 
protection of states in case of domestic violence); id. amend. XIV, § 4 (voiding any debt 
“incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion”). Consequently, the Second Amendment 
cannot be construed to guarantee a right to armed rebellion. See Miller, supra note 76, at 
1319-20; see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951) (“Whatever theoretical 
merit there may be to the argument that there is a ‘right’ to rebellion against dictatorial 
governments is without force where the existing structure of the government provides for 
peaceful and orderly change.”). 
424. Patrick Charles has listed some types of restrictions that existed historically on the right to 
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a given regulation, or absent that, some precedent or functional reason for the 
regulation, and so long as the regulation does not destroy the right in its 
fundamentals, then it would seem to be constitutional.425 
At its core, the right to keep and bear arms is also related to individual 
|self-defense.426 Therefore, regulations that render a person unable in all 
circumstances to defend himself would destroy the right in its fundamentals.427 
However, regulations that stop short of destroying the fundamental right in 
this way would be constitutional. So, for instance, a regulation that forbade 
firearms from travelling out of doors but permitted less lethal defensive 
weapons, such as pepper spray or tasers, could potentially pass constitutional 
muster. Alternatively, a regulation that permitted the removal of firearms from 
one’s premises only in circumstances of imminent physical injury or death 
would not destroy the right in its fundamentals. But, of course, the 
fundamentals of the Second Amendment right need not be articulated in this 
fashion. Again, the question is one of abstraction: a fundamental right to “self 
defense,” like the right to “the pursuit of happiness” or “the right to be let 
alone,” may be adequate moral propositions, but operate at too high a level of 
abstraction to be useful as law.428 The level of abstraction must be tethered to 
the text of the Second Amendment itself,429 but it also must be informed by the 
Amendment’s relationship with other textual provisions, history, and the 
structure of the Constitution as a whole. Finally, the analysis must justify 
judicial as opposed to legislative involvement.430 
                                                                                                                                                          
keep and bear arms. See Charles, supra note 57, at 26. 
425. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (assuring legislatures that they possess “a variety of tools for 
combating th[e] problem [of handgun violence], including some measures regulating 
handguns” short of “absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the 
home”). 
426. Id. at 599 (referring to self-defense as the “central component” of the Second Amendment); 
see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 
599) (same). 
427. Cf. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 249 (1846) (finding that a law that renders the right to keep 
and bear arms nugatory under the pretense of regulation is unconstitutional).  
428. See Easterbrook, supra note 388, at 364. 
429. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 
427, 494 (2007) (“The proper level of generality for the constitutional principles in the text 
is the one we find in the text itself.”). Neither I nor a majority of the Court think the level of 
generality for the right to “bear” arms is determined by the strict lexical meaning of the 
word “bear.” 
430. See supra text accompanying notes 402-410. 
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3. The Test in Action: High Capacity Magazines 
Federal law formerly prohibited magazines that held more than ten rounds 
of ammunition.431 Some states and localities still prohibit similar large-capacity 
magazines or weapons.432 With respect to a firearm that can hold more than ten 
rounds of ammunition, for example, the analysis might work as follows. First, 
the plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of 
constitutionality.433 She must demonstrate that a firearm with a capacity of 
more than ten rounds of ammunition even counts as an “arm” for purposes of 
the Second Amendment.434 Just as new causes of action can trigger the Seventh 
Amendment right to a trial by jury, or new forms of surveillance can implicate 
the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches,435 modern 
technology can implicate the Second Amendment, even if the precise weapon 
under consideration did not exist in 1791. Beginning broadly, the plaintiff could 
argue that the term “arm” in 1791 meant “any thing that a man . . . takes into 
his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another,”436 and that this 
definition has not changed since that time. This textual definition, however, 
would likely be too broad, as it would encompass high explosive rounds, 
                                                                
431. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110103(b), 
108 Stat. 1796, 1999 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(31) (1994)) (repealed 1994); id.  
§ 110103(a), 108 Stat. at 1999 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(w)) (repealed 1994). 
432. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-305; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3j (West 2012); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 265.00(23) (McKinney 2008).  
433. The need for the plaintiff to overcome the presumption of constitutionality is generally less 
onerous for allegations of a violation of an enumerated right. See United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). However, the presumption of constitutionality is 
strengthened by other textual and historical features that repose regulatory authority in 
other branches of government over the militia—even an unorganized one. See U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8 (giving Congress power to “organiz[e], arm[], and disciplin[e]” the militia, and 
giving states authority to designate the leaders of such militias); id. amend. II (providing 
that arms are protected because of the need for a “well regulated” militia); cf. United States 
v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883) (articulating a presumption of constitutionality for 
congressional legislation). The historical framework in this Article attempts to respect the 
extent to which firearms implicate both the Second Amendment individual right and the 
authority of federal and state officials to regulate weapons, especially when borne in public 
for the purpose of self-defense and crime control. 
434. This first inquiry is a critical step that many gun-rights advocates overlook. See supra note 
382. 
435. See Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27, 33-36 (2001) (recognizing that changes in 
technology, as through thermal imaging devices, can affect the well-established and 
historical Fourth Amendment protections of the home). 
436. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (quoting TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, 1 
A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (London, W. Flexney, 2d ed. 1771)). 
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grenade launchers, and Stinger missiles.437 Simply put, there are some weapons 
that, despite their superficial similarity to a weapon that existed in 1791 or 
1868, are simply too hazardous to fall within the category of “arm” as that term 
would have been commonly understood.438 Hence, she would likely need to 
marshal historical evidence that a firearm with more than ten rounds bears 
some resemblance to—or is a “lineal descendent[]”439 of—arms in “common 
use”440 during the relevant time period. Such a claim might focus on whether 
weapons capable of rapid reloading, multiple firing, or excess capacity, were 
understood to qualify as a personal “arm” in common use for purposes of the 
individual right to keep and bear arms. Her argument would be that a firearm 
with more than a ten-round capacity is sufficiently analogous to such a weapon 
that a reasonable person would have understood it to be an “arm.” 
Once the plaintiff has met the threshold scope issue, the burden would 
shift to the defendant to establish that the regulation is not an infringement. 
An infringement here means roughly what a failure to preserve means in the 
Seventh Amendment: a regulation that destroys the right in its 
fundamentals.441 A defendant would show that the right has not been 
                                                                
437. In the same sense, a plaintiff would need to establish that “keep” and “bear” support 
meanings similar to what is understood by those terms at the historically relevant periods 
for purposes of arms, rather than engage in a simple semantic exercise of demonstrating 
they mean the same thing now as they did in the years from 1791 to 1868. See supra text 
accompanying note 266; see also Allen, supra note 266, at 202-08 (making similar points 
concerning a literalist approach to the Second Amendment). 
438. See Allen, supra note 266, at 202 (observing that “the Second Amendment is fundamentally 
different, for interpretative purposes, from other constitutional provisions that have been 
applied to changing technologies”). Inevitably, whether something falls within or without 
that definition will require some consequentialist investigation. But that only shows that 
construction of categories in open-textured sections of the Constitution cannot be 
completely insulated from consequentialist reasoning. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and 
Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 388 (2009) 
(recognizing that categories are often constructed by balancing various conflicting policies). 
The analysis in this Article suggests that the construction of the categories can be informed 
and restrained by historical data and analogical reasoning, rather than through a purely 
policy-oriented investigation. 
439. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (question of Roberts, 
C.J.)). 
440. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624. In this sense, Judge Kavanaugh’s statement that weapons “are in 
common use today” is slightly off the mark. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1287 (emphasis added). 
The question is whether the weapon at issue is one analogous to one in common use during 
the relevant ratification period, not in common use today. See Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 77, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (question of Roberts, C.J.) (speaking of “lineal 
descendents” of older firearms). 
441. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 310, at 1063. 
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destroyed in its fundamentals by showing that the regulation is analogous to a 
historical restriction on the right, is supported by relevant precedent, or is 
justified by functional considerations, so long as those considerations do not 
destroy the reason for the Second Amendment’s codification.442 
For example, the defendant might point to historical regulations that 
restricted private access to certain especially lethal or dangerous weapons, or 
that restricted the private possession of quantities of powder or ammunition.443 
The defendant could then argue that regulations restricting these weapons or 
quantities of ammunition are sufficiently analogous to a restriction on the 
amount of ammunition in a firearm to meet constitutional muster. 
Alternatively, the defendant may show precedent for this type of regulation. 
Absent clearly analogous historical restrictions, the defendant may point to 
precedent from the states on the amount, size, or capacities of weapons that a 
person could keep. For example, the defendant could point to the fact that 
there is precedent for regulations on access to weapons that are particularly 
obnoxious, or whose use is primarily criminal or military, rather than 
recreational. 
 Finally, if these considerations are not dispositive, one might then as a last 
resort consider the functional considerations of the regulation. These 
considerations would not be completely open-ended, but, as Patrick Charles 
has suggested, would be shaped by reference to ideological commitments 
concerning the right of self-defense, public safety, and the distribution of 
coercive power between private and public parties.444 If the Second 
Amendment is about access to the tools of private self-defense in the home, 
would allowing only magazines with fewer than eleven rounds preclude 
                                                                
442. In other words, functional considerations cannot be used to argue for interpretations that 
flatly contradict the text itself. Cf. Rosenthal, supra note 266, at 1207 (“[A] changed reading 
of constitutional text cannot be based on a fact or belief that would have produced a 
different text in the first instance . . . .” (citing and describing the “fidelity in translation” 
theory of Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1251-63 (1993))). 
443. For example, both King Henry VII and Henry VIII placed restrictions on the private 
ownership of new lethal technologies such as the crossbow and what they called  
“hand-guns.” These restrictions were apparently “rigidly enforced” in England at least until 
1539. See RALPH PAYNE-GALLWEY, THE CROSSBOW: ITS MILITARY AND SPORTING HISTORY, 
CONSTRUCTION AND USE 32-33 (2007). They were apparently subsequently abandoned. See 
id. at 34. Whether such regulations should be considered part of the historical and common 
law understanding of permissible restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms is 
contested. See Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 239 n.235 (1983) (raising such doubts). 
444. See Charles, supra note 332, at 229 (stating that the matter of permissible gun control 
regulation is resolved “by examining the ideological and philosophical origins of gun 
control, not by finding an exact eighteenth-century parallel”). 
  
text, history, and tradition 
929 
 
effective exercise of that prerogative? This latter inquiry, as in the Seventh 
Amendment context, might focus on institutional arrangements more broadly. 
Who is in a better position to determine how many rounds are necessary to 
defend a person’s home? Have legislatures already protected a particular type 
of weapon?445 What is more likely: the harm caused because a person did not 
have the eleventh bullet, or the harm caused by the person who did?  
The question, of course, is where to leave the discretion, and it appears that in 
the Second Amendment—unlike, perhaps, in other areas of constitutional 
rights—discretion is left with the political branches.446 In any event, so long as 
such a regulation does not destroy the fundamental aspects of the right (at 
whatever level of abstraction those fundamentals are defined),447 the regulation 
is legitimate. 
iv.  rewards and risks of a historical test for the  
second amendment 
A. Rewards 
Attempting to implement the Second Amendment by reference to what the 
Court has done with the right to trial by jury could produce some tangible 
rewards. First, this approach would hold the Court to its current stated desire 
to avoid balancing tests in Second Amendment cases. To the extent that 
originalists in particular desire that their history-centered methodology be 
more than a mere rhetorical weapon,448 it makes sense to show how the 
                                                                
445. Cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 213 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result) (stating that 
the statutory canon of constitutional avoidance recognizes that “[t]he task of defining the 
objectives of public policy and weighing the relative merits of alternative means of reaching 
those objectives belongs to the legislature”). But see Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (recognizing that 
the constitutional text “takes certain policy choices off the table”). 
446. For support for this proposition, see Miller, supra note 76, at 1318-21. Consider also 
Bernadette Meyler’s summary of Keith Whittington’s originalism, which she explains as 
follows: “Once indeterminacy is located, the task of constitutional construction begins, a 
task that should be allocated to the political branches rather than the judiciary.” Meyler, 
supra note 19, at 594 (citing, but disagreeing with, KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 205 (1999)). 
447. The idea of a core purpose of self-defense, of course, leads to the debate as to whether the 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense extends outside the home. This is a position I 
have already discussed and do not need to revisit here. See Miller, supra note 76, at 1350; 
Miller, Retail Rebellion, supra note 341, at 972-74. 
448. See David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
969, 975 (2008) (describing originalism as a “rhetorical weapon”). 
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methodology can actually help decide numerous discrete, factually disparate 
cases.449 Second, it would minimize the problem that has befallen Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence: a proliferation of categories that provide little 
guidance at all. Third, it would recognize the residual institutional parameters 
of the right to keep and bear arms. 
1. Reducing Judicial Empiricism  
The Roberts Court is wary of empowering judges with an open-ended 
ability to balance government interests against constitutional rights. Kathleen 
Sullivan has noted that courts take a big risk when they engage in overt 
balancing, and even more so when the test actually requires some express 
evaluation of the government interest. As Professor Sullivan observes, 
intermediate scrutiny in particular exposes the Court “to the charge of 
‘legislating from the bench’”450—a charge that “[n]o amount of bureaucratic 
lingo in the formulas of intermediate scrutiny (‘substantial, significant, 
important interest,’ ‘directly, sub[s]tantially, closely served,’ ‘no more 
extensive than necessary’) can wholly dispel . . . .”451 The lessons of the Court’s 
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, however, could temper this fear that 
judges, as opposed to the political branches, become empowered by balancing 
tests with loose policymaking authority. 
Second, few rights seem less conducive to levels of scrutiny than the right to 
keep and bear arms. Levels of scrutiny require courts to make difficult 
empirical judgments in areas in which they have limited ability and resources, 
as Justice Breyer noted in his McDonald dissent.452 How frequently does a 
person use a firearm to protect himself rather than to kill his neighbor? How 
effective is law enforcement at policing a particular neighborhood?453 Which is 
                                                                
449. See Rosenthal, supra note 266, at 1188 (stating that originalism is only “genuinely distinctive 
and useful . . . if, in practice, it provides a genuinely originalist vehicle for deciding real 
cases”). I defer to others as to whether the approach outlined in this Article satisfies that 
condition, or whether it is indistinguishable from nonoriginalist methods. See id. 
450. Sullivan, supra note 66, at 301.  
451. Id. (footnote omitted). 
452. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3128 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[J]udges do not know the answers to the kinds of empirically based questions that will 
often determine the need for particular forms of gun regulation. Nor do they have readily 
available ‘tools’ for finding and evaluating the technical material submitted by others.”); see 
also Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court 
Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1660 (2005) (noting a general consensus that courts are “less able 
[than other institutions] to resolve complicated factual questions”). 
453. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3126 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asking rhetorically about budget cuts 
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more common: the kindergarten teacher who fights off a stalker, or the 
kindergarten teacher’s pupil who accidentally injures herself with a misplaced 
firearm?454 And how does the Court evaluate the methodological soundness of 
this kind of evidence?455 
Second Amendment scrutiny also makes little practical sense. The 
government’s central goal is the welfare and safety of its citizens.456 The very 
purpose of government is to monopolize legitimate violence.457 But the 
McDonald Court forcefully argued that the welfare and safety of the populace 
has no special meaning when it comes to firearm restrictions. If that is the case, 
then what exactly is the court balancing? If public safety cannot be weighed as 
a compelling or even an important interest, what is left to put on the scale? 
Perhaps one answer is that scrutiny is designed to “smoke out” otherwise 
impermissible motives.458 Scrutiny puts governments to the proof that their 
motives are pure and not designed to curtail fundamental liberties. But that 
begs the question of impermissible motive. Wholesale disarmament of the 
entire citizenry is clearly an impermissible motive; otherwise there would be no 
Second Amendment at all. But constitutional protection of firearms in the 
home, which Heller recognizes, already prevents that. What then, short of 
                                                                                                                                                          
on police and “[h]ow effective . . . that police force [was] to begin with”). 
454. Id. at 3126-29 (raising similar hypotheticals). 
455. Gowder v. City of Chicago, No. 11–CV-1304, 2012 WL 2325826, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 
2012) (observing that “pointing to certain studies as . . . justification” creates the very same 
empirically driven inquiry Justice Scalia says should be avoided in Second Amendment cases 
because “for every study, there can be a credible or convincing rebuttal study”). Of course, 
Gowder minimizes the fact that historical evidence itself can generate similar disagreement. 
456. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct.. at 3114 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) 
(“[W]e can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the 
National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and 
vindication of its victims.”); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (“The promotion of 
safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State’s police 
power . . . .”)). 
457. “[T]he state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly 
of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory . . . .” Max Weber, Politics as a 
Vocation (Jan. 28, 1919), in THE VOCATION LECTURES 33 (David Owen & Tracy B. Strong 
eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004). 
458. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality decision) 
(“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that 
the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect 
tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this compelling goal so closely that 
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial 
prejudice or stereotype.”); see also Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward a 
Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 365 (1995) (suggesting that 
scrutiny can “smoke out” bad motives in economic liberty matters). 
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universal citizen disarmament, is an impermissible motive?459 Is the safety of 
law enforcement an impermissible motive? Is keeping guns out of the hands of 
persons who plan to overthrow the state or federal government an 
impermissible motive? Is advancing a moral preference for dialogue, orderly 
dispute resolution, or the political process (rather than threats of violence) an 
impermissible motive?460 
Levels-of-scrutiny analysis also depends on the judicial capacity to make 
empirical judgments about what regulations actually relate to a legitimate 
motive and what regulations are pretext. For example, if it is permissible to 
protect the health and welfare of police officers, does a regulation that keeps 
guns out of automobiles bear a substantial relation to that purpose, or is it a 
pretext? Does the matter of “fit” between the regulation and its purpose change 
if the regulation is in New York City rather than Dubuque?461 Even if the 
scrutiny question is not about smoking out impermissible motives, but is, 
instead, about not inhibiting activity that Americans consider wholesome and 
beneficial, this raises again the question of the operative constitutional 
proposition of the right to keep and bear arms, and how much incursion is too 
much incursion.462 
Not all individual rights need to be balanced. As Adam Winkler has 
observed, there is a common misperception that fundamental rights in the Bill 
of Rights cannot be impaired unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest. Professor Winkler notes: 
The Court has never purported to apply strict scrutiny in every 
provision of the Bill of Rights. . . . Laws invading on First Amendment 
rights of speech, association, and religious liberty are often subject to 
strict scrutiny, as are laws that restrict the due process and (invisible) 
equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. But strict scrutiny 
                                                                
459. Put another way, and to use the terminology of Mitchell Berman and Kermit Roosevelt, 
what, precisely is the “constitutional[ly] operative proposition” of the Second Amendment? 
Self-defense? Self-defense at home? Self-defense from tyranny? Autonomy? Maintenance of 
an unorganized militia? Maintenance of an unorganized militia capable of defeating a 
standing army? See Roosevelt, supra note 452, at 1681; see also Berman, supra note 256, at 1 
(discussing the idea of operative propositions as opposed to decision rules). 
460. Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1991) (finding that moral 
disapproval of nude dancing justified restrictions on that activity); Sullivan, supra note 66, 
at 305. 
461. Cf. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937) (stating that the Court will not 
search for “hidden motives” behind a tax on firearms dealers). 
462. See Roosevelt, supra note 452, at 1684 (discussing how scrutiny “ensur[es] that the 
government has not intruded on highly important interests needlessly or without adequate 
justification”). 
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is nowhere to be found in the jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 
the Third Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, 
the Seventh Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Ninth 
Amendment, or the Tenth Amendment. Two amendments trigger strict 
scrutiny; eight do not.463 
Winkler wrote those lines before Heller, but his critique remains sound. 
The Second Amendment does not require express balancing or levels of 
scrutiny analysis. And the Court’s stated preference for originalist, or at least 
historically grounded, arguments about the Second Amendment’s scope means 
that any test that hints at interest balancing is not likely to garner support 
among more than a plurality of the existing Heller and McDonald majorities. 
This Article’s framework respects that reality. 
 2. Reducing the Potential of Categorical Creep 
There is also a risk that Second Amendment jurisprudence will suffer the 
fate of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It will begin with a categorical test, 
but undergo categorical creep, as the various occasions involving “self-
defense,” “carrying,” and “keeping” arise.464 As one scholar put it with respect 
to the Fourth Amendment, the  
application of different principles to seizures of persons than to seizures 
of things [and] the development of differ[ent] rules for arrests in 
restaurants than for arrests in houses . . . have rendered the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment a Ptolemaic system. Only a police officer who studies 
Professor LaFave’s three-volume treatise . . . can master the epicycles.465 
One can imagine lower courts forced to navigate a similar set of 
interlocking epicycles for gun-rights claims. There could be the felon-in-
possession category, not to be confused with the misdemeanant-in-possession 
category, not to be confused with the domestic-batterer-misdemeanant-in-
possession category, not to be confused with the domestic-batterer-
                                                                
463. Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 
229 (2006); see also Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
(listing rights not subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny analysis). 
464. Cf. Blocher, supra note 55, at 435-36 (noting that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
began with a “flat ban” on evidence but “beg[a]t” so many exceptions that the doctrine 
became “so dotted with holes and sub-rules” as to be unrecognizable). 
465. Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 287 
(1984). 
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misdemeanant-in-possession-at-home category, and so on. In its desire to rely 
upon rules and avoid balancing, the Court could offer no rule at all. 
The analysis in this Article would reduce, but cannot eliminate, this risk. It 
invites courts to frame historical analogues so that they function at a high 
enough level of generality to encompass both the scope of the right and the 
scope of permissible regulation or protection under the Second Amendment. 
Just as Seventh Amendment analogues enable the Seventh Amendment to 
cover new causes of action and allow for new forms of procedural regulation, 
courts could identify a level of generality in Second Amendment analogues that 
expands both the number of technologies and practices that implicate the 
Second Amendment and the scope of permissible limits. In this way, while 
more types of phenomena will implicate the Second Amendment, the actual 
content of the categories of permissible keeping, bearing, and arms will be left 
to more politically responsive branches. 
3. Acknowledging the Institutional Aspects of the Right To Keep and 
 Bear Arms 
Both Heller and McDonald disparaged the organized militia as an 
institution that structures the meaning of the Second Amendment right. Heller 
in particular treated the militia portion of the Second Amendment as little 
more than a throat-clearing exercise. Some of the majority’s skepticism is 
justifiable, but largely on historical rather than strictly textual grounds. During 
Reconstruction, the militia that the Framers conceived of as a virtuous group of 
citizen-soldiers became a tool of racist oppression.466 Nonetheless, the clause 
“[a] well regulated Militia”467 has not been purged from the text. This clause, 
even if prefatory, must still be integrated into an understanding of the Second 
Amendment in particular, as well as into the Constitution as a whole.468 
Accordingly, the tailoring portion of the historical test grants the politically 
responsive branches of government latitude to regulate the militia—both 
                                                                
466. For treatments of the change and doctrinal relevance of the militia from the Founding to 
Reconstruction, see AMAR, supra note 422, at 325-27, 390-91; Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond 
T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. 
L.J. 309, 341-49 (1991) (discussing the disarmament of African-Americans during 
antebellum and Reconstruction periods); Miller, Retail Rebellion, supra note 341, at 959-67 
(discussing the violence of law enforcement during Reconstruction). 
467. U.S. CONST. amend II. 
468. See David C. Williams, The Unitary Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 822, 829 (1998) 
(“[Judges] should seek to give both [the prefatory “militia” and the operative “keep and 
bear arms” clauses] as much meaning as possible, and they should prefer those 
interpretations that make the two clauses as consistent as possible.”). 
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organized and unorganized—so long as the regulations do not destroy the right 
to keep and bear arms for personal defense in its fundamentals. In doing so, 
this test best integrates the term “militia” as it is used throughout the 
Constitution,469 and guarantees that Heller and McDonald have not rendered 
that portion of the Second Amendment “extinct.”470 
B. Risks 
1. The Reek of Law-Office History  
As much as the Seventh Amendment provides positive instruction for how 
the courts may implement the Second Amendment, it also serves as a 
cautionary tale. Irrespective of outcomes, a Second Amendment test driven by 
too rigid an application of history could lead to the same problem that has 
afflicted the Seventh Amendment: a test that demands “intricate examination 
of historical detail which . . . ‘reek[s] unduly of the study.’”471 
There is already an undeniable fustiness about Heller. How many federal 
district court judges, not to mention city municipal court officers,472 have the 
time or ability to consult and consider John Ayliffe’s 1734 treatise A New 
Pandect of Roman Civil Law, or John Brydall’s 1704 work Privilegia Magnatud 
apud Anglos, both of which were cited and quoted in Heller?473 Judges are not 
historians, and so, in addition to the risk that they will not understand the 
materials they are charged to consult, there is the additional risk that they will 
not conduct a dispassionate examination of the historical evidence and will 
simply marshal historical anecdotes to achieve what they have already decided 
is the preferred outcome.474 
Certainly, these are challenges to developing a historical test for the Second 
Amendment. But whatever the challenges, the written nature of our 
Constitution commands some engagement with history, no matter the 
                                                                
469. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing for divided responsibility between Congress and the 
states for discipline and training of the militia); id. art. II, § 2 (designating the President 
Commander-in-Chief of the militia when called into service). 
470. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (“[I]t is not the role of this 
Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.”). 
471. Redish, supra note 113, at 486-87 (quoting Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 
1961)). 
472. Bound, as they are, by McDonald. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
473. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 583 n.7, 587 n.10 (2008) (citing and quoting same). 
474. Charles, supra note 57, at 11 (noting the difference between the role of historians and that of 
advocates or jurists). 
  
the yale law journal 122:852   2013  
936 
 
difficulty.475 The important caveat for the historical test for the Second 
Amendment is that engagement with history is the beginning point. It sets the 
terms of the process of analogical reasoning, a task at which lawyers and judges 
consider themselves relatively adept.476 Historical analogues, as Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence shows, can be understood to govern both the scope 
of the Second Amendment right and the scope of permissible regulations of 
that right. To the extent that a historical test for the Second Amendment 
permits discretion, and especially discretion reposed in those bodies most 
responsible for policymaking, perhaps this approach will make the smell of 
law-office history less noisome. 
2. The Persistence of the Collapse Problem  
Neither will this suggested framework eliminate the problem of analytical 
collapse. The second part of the test, whether a regulation interferes with the 
right in its “fundamentals,” is an easier step than is the first, which requires 
more historical heavy lifting in terms of defining the right or finding the 
appropriate historical analogue. But that problem is already present in the 
existing standards of review used by intermediate courts.  
Again, the answer is that forcing the judge to engage at some level with the 
historical materials, even at the level of analogical reasoning, controls 
discretion to a degree that is absent without such a process. Judgment cannot 
be taken out of the process of judging. The fact that some originalists oversold 
their methodology as a way to take discretion out of constitutional law is not a 
good reason to reject history and tradition altogether.477 The historical test for 
the Second Amendment, and especially its requirement of linking either the 
right itself or a regulation to a historical analogue, forces judges at least to 
pause before they launch into a policy prescription that may not be consonant 
with the text, history, or structure of the document.478 Furthermore, it imposes 
                                                                
475. Cf. Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 594 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(observing that “[o]ur obligation to the Constitution and its Bill of Rights” requires such 
historical investigations); Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 114, at 450 (noting that history 
must be the place to begin in Seventh Amendment adjudication).  
476. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-8 (1949) (discussing the 
centrality of analogical reasoning to legal reasoning). 
477. See Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 617 (2008) (“The 
new originalism, like the old, fails to deliver on its claim about eliminating judicial 
subjectivity, judgment, and choice.”). For more on originalism’s failure to deliver on its 
promises, see Smith, supra note 23, at 710-11, 733, which discusses originalism’s inability to 
consistently defend its claim to political neutrality. 
478. See Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1194 
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a type of Burkean humility by obliging the judiciary to attempt to link its 
current judgments to the accumulated judgments of the past.479 
3. Popular, but Not Constitutionally Popular  
A final problem with this approach is that, although it may result in 
decisions that have broad popular support, if originalism is now the people’s 
methodology of choice,480 it may create friction between outcomes and 
reasoning, at least among those people who are watching.  
Without a doubt, citizens want some voice in how and which firearms are 
kept and where they are borne. Even after Heller and McDonald, public opinion 
polling shows strong support for reasonable regulation in those areas.481 As a 
matter of brute politics, then, judgments taking those decisions away from 
legislatures or local officials will encounter some hostility. So, preserving 
regulation is popular. But this popular outcome is not so easily squared with 
originalism as an accessible form of popular constitutionalism. There is a type 
of popular originalism, often vocal, in which nonlawyers assert that they know 
what the Constitution says, and understand what the words “keep,” “bear,” 
“arm,” and “infringe” mean. Citizens may resent doctrinal embellishments that 
pull the text away from its plain, but contemporary, meaning. In all likelihood, 
whatever decision the Court makes, whether through the test articulated in this 
Article or some other test, a successful doctrinal apparatus will maximize 
popular will at the expense of originalism as a form of popular 
constitutionalism. 
conclusion 
This Article has argued that the Roberts Court has issued seemingly 
irreconcilable demands to lower courts: Be faithful to Second Amendment 
history, do not balance Second Amendment rights, and preserve reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                          
(1999) (justifying analogical reasoning by its tendency to create only “incremental, 
evolutionary” change). 
479. See id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 368-72 (2006) 
(discussing how minimalist decisions based on tradition may reduce the likelihood of 
catastrophic error). 
480. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008). 
481. See Guns, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/guns.htm (last visited Oct. 
24, 2012) (showing strong support for firearm ownership, as well as bans on assault rifles 
and high-capacity magazines). 
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firearm regulations. It argues that a Second Amendment historical test 
patterned on the Seventh Amendment may provide a pathway to a solution. 
The Court’s jurisprudence could be wrong on both fronts, of course. That 
is, it is perfectly plausible to argue that the Second Amendment’s emerging 
doctrine should not replicate the mistakes of its Seventh Amendment ancestor, 
and that a strict historical test should apply to both provisions—or to neither.  
But if what we expect from our judges is to apply history in ways that are 
not only faithful but useful, then the answer is not to permit judges to 
manipulate historical sources in any manner they prefer, but to create an 
analytical structure in which history can be integrated into adjudication despite 
the fact that history will be at times deeply contested or unknowable. This 
Article has attempted to set the discussion on that course. The hope is familiar: 
that history can be a guiding hand, rather than a dead one.482 
  
 
                                                                
482. See Colby, supra note 23, at 740 (noting that the “New Originalism” means that “we are not 
so much ruled by the dead hand of the past as gently guided by it”). 
